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There is a clear need, in view of significant competitive, technological and service changes taking 
place in the telecommunications sector, to review universal service obligations, their coverage, how they 
are financed and who is responsible for providing them. In many OECD countries, a primary longer term 
issue is how to provide universal service in the new competitive environment where voice is ubiquitous 
and cheap, voice revenues low and where voice has become just one of many applications provided on 
networks. Access too is changing, with more choice in platforms available that allow access to voice 
applications. This paper overviews the main issues that need to be examined in such a review with a view 
to the reform of universal service in a way consistent with emerging technological realities and competitive 
circumstances. The paper draws a number of conclusions outlined below. 
Important changes have already taken place in universal service in OECD countries, where market 
liberalization and technological developments in the telecommunications sector have resulted in 
improvements in telecommunications availability (through increased penetration of fixed line and wireless 
as well as enhanced quality of service), affordability (through lower prices, in overall terms, and through 
pre-paid mobile) and accessibility (improved through voluntary but also through regulatory schemes). As a 
result, there has been significant progress towards universal service. In an NGN environment where new 
technologies are competing, a question that arises is whether an approach towards universal service that 
was framed for a legacy network is still the appropriate policy? 
An increase in communications facilities and service competition is expected over the next ten years 
as the communications sector converges, shifts technology to one based on IP protocol and gravitates 
towards new kinds of networks built with technologies such as wireless, wireline, fibre, cable, powerline, 
and satellite. With such technological developments and a more competitive environment, cross-subsidy 
practices are likely to be increasingly unsustainable and an increasing number of countries are turning to 
the use of Universal Service Funds in order that the burden of USOs can be shared more equitably and 
flexibly among market participants. But as competition from sources such as VoIP, cable telephony, e-
mail, instant messaging, pre-paid mobile and pre-paid cheap long distance/international calling erodes the 
revenue base of telecommunications operators, Universal Service Funds too may come under pressure. The 
growing diversity of technologies and the capabilities of these new technologies require more precise 
reflection on what it is about telecommunications services that justifies a universal service policy, and how 
these telecommunications services should be defined. 
With the technological changes on the horizon, there seems significant potential for availability of 
telecommunications access, and hence services, in rural and remote areas to be largely achieved over the 
next ten years. Whether this potential materialises will depend importantly on the removal of disincentives 
to invest and barriers to entry (including those due to spectrum policy that generates artificial scarcity). 
This includes minimising price controls and subsidies that discourage competitive entry. All this is 
consistent with forbearance of regulation in a dynamic, increasingly competitive and convergent 
communications sector. If availability of telecommunications access is achieved, is universal service policy 
still necessary? If so, would access alone achieve the goals of universal service, or is it some package of 
affordable services that require access which should be the objective? 
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Universal service policies in an NGN environment should be constrained by the recognition that 
USOs should be specifically defined and targeted, transparent, competitively and technology neutral and 
cost-effective. Universal service objectives such as affordability and accessibility may be addressed by 
specifically targeted subsidies (including vouchers) that allow consumers in a multi-platform NGN 
environment to themselves choose the service provider and technology most suitable to their needs. In 
appropriate competitive circumstances, the use of well-designed competitive tenders can help generate 
incentives to contain costs, innovate, and reveal the true cost of delivering universal service thus 
minimising the subsidy required.  At the same time, it needs to be recalled that, in most OECD countries, 
the PSTN incumbent is still dominant in terms of access to traditional telephone service and the only 
operator with national (regional) coverage. 
As broadband access matures, it is becoming clearer that not all broadband access is the same. Each 
broadband technology has its own performance and economic characteristics, and positive or negative 
technical aspects. For example, cable, fibre, and DSL technologies have significant bandwidth advantages 
over broadband wireless local loop, BPL, and VSAT. However, cable, DSL, and fibre work best in high 
population density areas and may be uneconomic in less densely populated areas. A potential scenario in 
many OECD countries, therefore, is an environment where metropolitan areas have significantly richer 
capabilities than the rural areas. This may have long-term effects on social and economic opportunities in 
rural areas. Moreover, in the future, the quality of access, not merely the availability of access, may 
become the major consideration in setting policy.   
In rethinking universal access to the range of NGN services, a core issue is whether broadband 
should be part of USOs. The EU has already moved from voice USOs to include a data USO with a 
functional Internet access provision in its current USO Directive. No doubt there will be close 
examination of whether functional access in an NGN environment necessitates an upgrade to broadband 
access. Indeed, there are strident calls for such a policy already. But  at least at this early stage of 
broadband penetration  there are strong reasons to be wary of using a blunt, blanket USO approach that 
could distort competition and investment incentives. However, this view may require regular 
reconsideration because universal service is an evolving concept. More generally, as competition develops 
through the use of unbundling in a number of countries, it may be necessary to determine the role of 
unbundled lines in the provision of universal service. 
In an NGN environment, current funding arrangements for USOs may be unsustainable. A variety of 
alternative arrangements can be envisaged ranging from a tax on each telephone number to financing 
through general taxation revenue. They should be thoroughly assessed against a number of criteria, such as 
economic efficiency, equity and competitive entry as well as against current practice where the 
infrastructure and service providers directly fund universal service. 
As part of this assessment, governments may want to consider advantages that could be gained by 
funding the cost of pursuing the social objectives of USOs from government general taxation revenue. 
Importantly, government funding would link decisions concerning the nature and scope of universal 
service closely with financial responsibility for such decisions. This could prevail against excessive growth 
by installing in-built incentives to restrain political disposition for widening universal service expenditure. 
Certainly, while political advantages flowing from universal service programmes can be gained at the 
expense of operators and/or consumers, restraint over universal service (needed to stimulate innovation, 
best practice and cost-effective USO programmes and to minimise the distortions that can arise from 
excessive USO programmes) is less likely.   
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1. INTRODUCTION   
1.1  Introduction 
The voice market in recent years has a seen a shift in emphasis as traffic moved from the fixed 
network to mobile networks. This is primarily because competition in mobile networks provided 
consumers with a greater variety of services, quality, and prices as compared to fixed networks. As a result, 
traditional voice telephony services provided over fixed networks have become less important relative to 
data services that now often include voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. The Internet is 
spawning new applications, advanced wireless and media services are promising platform competition, all 
with IP at their core.   
Looking ahead, there is an expectation of further dramatic change in telecommunications. Voice 
services may become one of many applications provided on networks and may be bundled with a range of 
other services. Fixed and mobile voice are expected to become integrated. Already wireless 
communications have established themselves as important in providing widespread coverage of 
communications services. The emergence of new services delivered over cable television networks, fibre 
networks, satellite and powerlines all suggest that the previous reliance on wireline telecommunications 
networks may well diminish, although new DSL technologies have helped in rejuvenating fixed networks 
and widening the scope of applications they can provide. 
Many incumbent telecommunications operators are announcing a transition to so-called Next 
Generation Networks (NGN) to replace their existing circuit-switched networks.  Such changes are 
expected to have significant implications in the way voice services are provided and the characteristics of 
these services. In turn, this will impact on the longer-term nature and scope of universal service obligations 
(USOs), including the definition and financing of USOs.  However, NGN technologies may not reduce the 
high costs of access for some geographic areas that are presently considered unprofitable in the context of 
universal service. 
What is NGN? 
NGN is a concept rather than a single network. It is a packet-switched network providing a range of communications 
services, which uses transport technologies for several bandwidths and classes of service and in which service-related 
functions are independent of the underlying transport technologies. NGN covers multiple networks and layers  serving 
fixed, mobile and nomadic users. It is a means of providing services across a range of technologies giving users 
unrestricted access to different service providers. It supports general mobility, giving users consistent and ubiquitous 
service provision. At the heart of the concept is the integration of existing separate voice and data networks into a 
simpler and more flexible network using packet switch and IP protocols. This will enable voice, text and visual 
messages to be carried on the same network and for each type of message to be responded to in any of these formats 
on that network.  
Revenue erosion 
The liberalisation of telecommunications markets and the resulting competition has resulted in 
significantly lower prices for telecommunications services, in particular voice services. In addition, the 
rapid growth of mobile services across the OECD has meant that mobile penetration rates are for most 
OECD countries greater than fixed line penetration with mobile voice revenues accounting for more than 
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half of telecommunications revenue in many countries. The growth in the mobile voice market has also led 
to mobile services being substituted for fixed services resulting in many incumbent PSTN operators facing 
an overall decline in the number of subscriber lines. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)1 is also impacting 
on traditional voice telephony services using public switched telecommunications networks (PSTN). This 
may mean that the definition of universal service may have to be reviewed, new forms of funding may 
have to be found where it is considered necessary to support universal service or the present scope of 
USOs may have to be curtailed.  
Transition from PSTN to NGN 
The expected transition from PSTN to NGN is itself raising concerns. This is because the shift to 
NGN is likely to take place unevenly across customer groups or geography since it will probably occur last 
in less commercially attractive locations such as rural and remote areas. Moreover, the migration from 
PSTN networks could increase average per line costs of existing networks, lead to a deterioration in quality 
of service and even make their closure a possibility (unless obliged to remain in operation due to a USO). 
As a result, this transition to NGN could raise significant universal service issues. This transition also 
raises the issue of what attributes of the PSTN will endure. Is the PSTN to be totally displaced by 
competitive, market-based NGNs or are there functions, such as addressing, that should continue under 
regulatory authorities? 
1.2  Objectives of this paper  
The shift from a primarily wireline telecommunications network environment to a competitive 
telecommunications market with ever-changing players and new technologies requires a fundamental 
rethinking about coverage, funding and other arrangements pertaining to universal service. The primary 
objective of this paper is to stimulate such wider rethinking on this issue.  
• In an NGN environment with competing technologies, to what degree will universal service 
objectives be met by the market? 
• If universal service programmes are necessary in an NGN environment with a competitive 
market and new technologies, what is the role of USOs? 
• How do we secure USOs (and, indeed, whether we want to secure them) at a time of rapidly 
changing telecommunications technologies and potential substantial shifts in the revenue stream 
of PSTN operators? 
• What funding and other arrangements for USOs may be necessary in what is likely to be a very 
different telecommunications industry?  
This paper does not dwell on the problems faced in specific countries (e.g. the United States) due to 
specific USO mechanisms in those countries. Rather it is concerned with the impact of competition and 
technological developments (such as VoIP and Broadband wireless local loop) and of convergence on 
USO arrangements that is of concern to all OECD countries. In particular, the focus of the paper is on a 
longer-term (within a decade?) conceptual consideration of the impact of new IP-based services on 
USOs.  
But in drawing attention to longer-term issues, the paper has a shorter-term aim: to focus attention on 
the need for policies being developed to address more immediate short-term USO issues to also bear in 
mind these longer term issues. This is because mechanisms to address short-term problems should be 
consistent with and flexible enough to accommodate longer-term issues. This message seems timely 
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because a number of OECD countries have started reviews of USO arrangements and others are likely to 
follow.  
In Australia, a review of the operation of Australias USOs was conducted during 20042 to determine 
whether the regime was meeting its legislative objectives. In particular the review was required to analyse 
the USO costing and funding arrangements and the effectiveness of Australias contestability regime. In 
Japan, a review of the universal service fund system was launched in November 2004 by the 
Telecommunications Council3 with the report completed in October 2005. In 2004, Ofcoms strategic 
review of the UK telecommunications sector recognised the need to consider longer-term USO issues and 
in January 2005, Ofcom issued a complementary consultation to review universal service arrangements. In 
the European Union and United States, a review of universal service is expected over the next 12 months. 
In Canada, the government announced in April 2005 the formation of a panel to review 
telecommunications policy. 
To summarise, this paper aims to: 
• Identify problems that are developing for current approaches used to deliver USOs resulting from 
developments in competition (e.g. from wireless operators) and new technology (e.g. VoIP). 
• Analyse whether USOs should be maintained in an environment with many competing 
technologies, and if so in what form, and how it should be funded? 
• Identify developments related to the increasing importance of broadband that are likely to 
increase the importance of broadband capacity; should the scope of universal service be widened 
to include broadband? 
• Examine policy initiatives designed to promote availability, affordability and accessibility of 
telecommunications in an environment with competing technologies and communications 
services; and 
• Stimulate rethinking on universal service.  
1.3  Structure of the paper 
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 discusses the rationale and 
examples of the present scope of USOs. Section 3 discusses how market liberalisation, complemented by 
regulatory mechanisms, has impacted on the achievement of USO goals. The section reports considerable 
evidence of success in terms of increased penetration of telecommunications service, particularly as a 
consequence of the explosive growth in wireless services. There have also been significant price reductions 
and quality of service improvements. However, for some parts of the market, including service provision to 
inhabitants of rural and remote areas, support from regulatory mechanisms to encourage service provision 
has been required. Section 4 discusses problems with the current arrangements for funding and delivering 
USOs. These include revenue erosion resulting from competition, including competition from wireless 
and VoIP operators. Section 5 discusses longer-term issues relating to the nature and scope of USOs in an 
NGN era. One issue examined is whether broadband should be defined within the scope of USO. It 
discusses the proposition that if subsidy mechanisms are deemed necessary, funding from general 




2. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS 
2.1  The rationale of universal service obligations 
An economic, social and political rationale has been offered in support of Universal Service 
Obligations for telecommunications. 
Economic rationale 
Arguments for USOs based on economic efficiency considerations fall into two categories: those 
based on direct effects on users of telecommunications services and those relating to the interaction of the 
telecommunications sector with the broader economy. It is argued that when an additional person joins a 
communications network, existing members benefit because (a) they can contact a new person (a so-called 
network externality) and (b) they can receive calls from the new customer (a call externality). New 
prospective customers may not take these effects into account, and hence may stay off the network or not 
make calls, even though it would be efficient for them to join the network. 
There may also be other types of economic efficiency that a USO programme can help attain. Use of 
communications services can have broader effects throughout the economy, such as boosting productivity, 
enhancing economic growth, promoting regional development; increasing a countrys ability to compete 
globally, and raising standards of living.4 Low-cost communications can encourage teleworking and reduce 
congestion costs from travelling to work. These types of effects, while they may be important, are difficult 
to quantify and value. 
Social (equity) rationale 
The social rationale for USOs argues that being connected to the telecommunications network is 
necessary to avoid social exclusion and to participate fully in society, for example by accessing public 
services, and having access to emergency services. A part of the rationale for USOs is also to ensure that 
people on low incomes, those living in remote rural areas, disabled people and other vulnerable groups are 
still able to obtain the advantages of telecommunications. Such access is seen to go some way towards 
equalising conditions between rural and urban communities. It also provides a means by which people can 
exercise their social and political rights more effectively. However some vulnerable groups may 
underestimate the benefits of and therefore under-consume telephone services (the so-called merit 
goods rationale).  
Political rationale 
The basis of this rationale for USOs is that the nature and extent of USOs for telecommunications is 
essentially a political decision. For instance, in the United Kingdom it is the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, not Ofcom, who decides the scope of USOs. Some argue that universal service is also being 
driven by social inclusion considerations linked with emerging e-governance objectives.5 For instance, 
many OECD governments are intending to deliver many public services via the Internet. If a digital 
divide persists, the delivery of public services will not be universal. This in turn could worsen the 
exclusion of the very social groups reliant on many public services. Such considerations strengthen the 
case for funding support based on decisions made through the political process (such as those relating to 
decisions on taxation and budget allocation). This is discussed further later on in this paper. 
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2.2  The nature and scope of Universal Service Obligations: Examples from selected member 
countries  
Universal service in telecommunications covers real-time voice services, including access to 
emergency services (in some countries such as the United States) and directory information services. The 
broad dimensions of universal service and universal access6 goals include: 
• Availability  that the level, price and quality of service is the same wherever a person lives or 
works, so that residing in a high cost rural or remote area does not affect a persons ability to 
access communications services. 
• Affordability  that maintaining and using the service does not place an unreasonable burden on 
consumers, particularly on vulnerable disadvantaged consumers; and 
• Accessibility  that people with disability can use the service, so that a persons level of physical 
and mental ability does not preclude that person in terms of access to communications services. 
No standard universal service definition 
Within these broad dimensions, USOs is not a fixed concept and there is no single standard 
definition of what should be defined within the scope of such obligations.  
The scope of USOs in the United Kingdom 
An example of the scope of USOs is provided by the obligations imposed on BT as the USO provider 
in the United Kingdom (with Kingston Communications the designated USO provider in Hull).7 BT is 
required to:  
• Provide a connection to the fixed telephone network at a uniform price following a reasonable 
request, and provide a connection that allows functional Internet access. 
• Provide at least one scheme for consumers with special social needs who have difficulty 
affording telephone services. 
• Provide reasonable geographic coverage of public call box services. 
• Provide universal services at geographically uniform prices. 
• Ensure that tariffs for universal services do not entail payment for additional unnecessary 
services. 
• Provide a basic level of itemised billing at no extra charge. 
• Provide universal services that accord with defined quality thresholds. 
• Provide funds for a relay service for textphone users. 
• Supply and maintain directories and databases for the provision of directory services. 
The Universal Service Provider must respond to all reasonable requests to install a telephone line, 
offering the same prices irrespective of location. This obligation upon BT and Kingston is particularly 
important for those who live in remote areas. BT's standard charge for installing a new line is GBP 74.99. 
If an installation costs BT more than GBP 3 400 (about USD 6 250), then the customer must pay the 
difference above this figure.  
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BT and Kingston are required to offer special services to customers with disabilities including text 
relay service (that translates a person's voice into text) for people who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, special 
format telephone bills for people who are blind or who are partially sighted, and a priority fault repair 
service.  
The scope of USOs in the United States 
The considerable variation in the scope of USOs can be seen by examining USOs in the United States 
where they include the following four components:8 
• Low-income: This programme provides telecommunications service discounts to consumers with 
qualifying low incomes. 
• High-cost: This programme provides financial support to companies that provide 
telecommunications services in areas of the United States where the cost of providing service is 
high. 
• Schools and libraries: This programme helps to ensure that the nations classrooms and libraries 
receive access to educational resources that are accessible through the telecommunications 
network. 
• Rural health care: This programme helps to link health care providers located in rural areas to 
urban medical centres so that patients living in rural America will have access to the same 
advanced diagnostic and other medical services that are enjoyed in urban communities. 
2.3  From voice to data USOs 
The ISDN requirement in Australia 
In Australia, since 1999 everyone has access, upon request, to a data service with a 64 kbit/s digital 
data capacity. This is known as the Digital Data Service Obligation (DDSO) and relates to the provision of 
an ISDN comparable service. About 4% of the Australian population cannot access an ISDN service and 
therefore require a satellite solution. This is called the Special DDSO and includes an industry-funded 
rebate that acts as an offset to the cost of satellite equipment and installation that comprise the service.9  
Korea  
When the Korean government sold its final tranche of shares in KT in 2002, it did so on condition KT 
offered broadband to remote villages. At the time, broadband was specified to be a 1Mbit/s connection.10  
The EUs Functional Internet Access provision 
Under the terms of the EU Universal Service Directive, the designated universal service provider is 
required to provide a connection that provides functional Internet access (FIA).11 This obligation is 
limited to a single narrowband connection and does not extend to ISDN12 or broadband. It is notable that 
the Directive avoided setting a minimum data rate for functional Internet access and left it to individual 
Member States to decide if there was a need to specify this. Most EU Member States have neither defined 
FIA nor specified a binding minimum data speed in the context of the USO. The only exception to date is 
Sweden (discussed below). Guidelines have been set in the United Kingdom but these are not legal 




In May 2004, the Swedish government issued a regulation that requires connections to the fixed 
network to be capable of a minimum of 20 kbit/s. Where a subscriber requests a connection with a 
minimum data speed, this should be provided without adversely affecting the subscribers ability to obtain 
access to broadband, e.g. the provider should avoid installing Digital Access Carrier System (DACS). 
United Kingdom 
In July 2003, Ofcom issued guidelines that specified 28.8 kbit/s as a reasonable minimum data rate.13 
While Ofcom did not mandate a minimum speed, it expressed the view that, at that time, a connection 
speed of 28.8 kbit/s was a reasonable benchmark for functional Internet access. Ofcom acknowledged that 
over time this rate may need to be revised to reflect advances in networks and equipment, and changing 
social and economic conditions. Subsequently in January 2005, Ofcom launched a review of the Universal 
Service Obligations including functional Internet access and sought opinions regarding the future direction 
of its policies on a number of issues. In relation to the data rate for functional Internet access, Ofcom 
concluded in its review that the benchmark minimum of 28.8 kbit/s should not be changed at that time.14 
Ireland 
In Ireland, ComReg (the telecommunications regulator) has specified15 a requirement that eircom 
adopt 28.8 kbit/s as a reasonable minimum data rate for functional Internet access. ComReg believes that it 
is inappropriate to impose a requirement to enable all lines to achieve the minimum data rate as the 
necessary investment would be likely to divert resources away from other productive capital works. In 
particular, ComReg does not wish to cause any interruption in the commercial plans for broadband roll out. 
However, ComReg believes that eircom should publicly report on the numbers of lines that do not support 
the target data rate. As with the data rate itself, ComReg considers that there should be a general target set 
that eircom should strive to meet.  
ComReg reported that it had considered the imposition of a binding requirement for 100% of lines to 
be capable of a reasonable minimum data rate of 28.8kbit/s but that this had raised issues including 
whether the increased benefits to consumers arising from the imposition of such a requirement could be 
commensurate with the cost to the Universal Service Provider and whether those benefits could be 
achieved in a more effective fashion. In both cases, it was felt that the benefit in terms of increased data 
speed for a specific number of users would be negligible while the costs to eircom would be of such a scale 
that it was likely to divert investment funds from projects that would have a more beneficial consumer 
impact. 
These conclusions have been noted because they are relevant to the discussion later on in this paper 
about the desirability of including broadband within the scope of USOs.  
United States 
As noted earlier, the United States has included access to broadband to schools and libraries as part of 
USOs. In addition, public and non-profit health care providers in rural areas can receive discounts on 
monthly telecommunications charges, installation charges, and long-distance Internet connection charges 
so that health care providers serving rural communities pay no more than their urban counterparts for 
telecommunications services necessary for the provision of health care. 
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3. IMPACT OF MARKET LIBERALISATION ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
3.1  Impact of market liberalisation 
Experience in OECD countries has shown that the entry of private telecommunications operators into 
the market improves teledensity, lowers prices (which improves affordability), enhances quality of service, 
and increases at least the short-run profitability of telecommunications operators by providing incentives 
for efficient operation, greater levels of investment and network rollout.16  
Increased teledensity. Total teledensity (i.e. both fixed line and mobile) has increased in all OECD 
countries. But due to the popularity of mobile service (and ADSL which makes a second line for Internet 
use unnecessary), some economies have seen declines in fixed teledensity. Indeed, mobile teledensity now 
exceeds fixed line density in most OECD economies. Pre-paid customers have been a major driver of 
mobile usage increasing sharply to represent an average of over 40% of all mobile customers in OECD 
countries in 2003 (OECD, Communications Outlook 2005) and over 60% in developing economies. These 
trends are of close relevance to universal service. Mobile service is still a premium service in terms of call 
prices but it has the attraction of low up-front connection fees (i.e. handset plus SIM card), instant access 
(i.e. no waiting list) and control of budget. Although mobile services are not part of universal service 
obligations, in many countries the mobile licence includes provision for geographic and population 
coverage. In some countries, such as France, governments with the assistance of regional authorities have 
partially subsidised the extension of network coverage to include geographic areas not previously covered 
by mobile networks.  
Lower prices. Lower prices help to attain universal service by improving affordability. In some 
OECD countries, domestic long-distance prices per minute have fallen by 25% (Australia) to 50% (New 
Zealand) since 1998. In many countries, international prices have fallen more than domestic long distance 
prices because that is where profit margins are highest and competition is fiercest at the start of 
competition. Also, there is additional pressure on international prices from call-back operators, simple 
international resale (where this is permitted) and now VoIP services.  
A distinctive feature of price changes resulting from market liberalisation has been increases in line 
rentals as part of price-rebalancing. This is discussed further later. Australia has had the biggest increase in 
line rentals for residential customers since 2000 with Telstra raising monthly rentals from AUD 11.95 to 
AUD 26.95.  
3.2 Technological change and universal service  
Mobile communications is an example of how technology has extended the limits of market forces in 
reaching areas unserved by the fixed network, often at lower cost.17 Mobile operators have translated this 
lower cost base into affordable pre-paid packages that allow low income users basic connection to the 
network. Pre-payment allows operators to lower operational costs and reduce credit risk, but also gives 
users more control over expenditure than traditional post paid solutions, thus increasing affordability for 
low income users. Mobile services are increasingly available to rural users as well. Indeed, the wireless 
expansion could mean that some operators specialising in the provision of rural service can provide service 
even in the most remote areas. 
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In short, competition has resulted in increased availability and lower prices have delivered greater 
affordability. Mobile has brought other innovations as well, such as public mobile payphones and short 
messaging service (SMS). Indeed, SMS is cheaper than voice and means that mobile users can engage in a 
kind of e-mail. In fact, some even argue that mobile has virtually eliminated the universal access problem 
for many of the urban poor and for many rural users as well.18  Nevertheless, mobile call prices still remain 
relatively high in most countries, as does the price for short message services so that the concept of 
affordability would need to be more nuanced before mobile services could replace fixed in the context of 
universal service obligations. 
Broadband wireless local loop 
There seems widespread expectation that important changes in rural universal service are likely. 
These changes will stem from the new suite of wireless technologies such as wireless local networks and 
broadband wireless local loop (which promises telecommunications coverage over a radius of about 
50 km) that could provide Internet access and voice service cheaply to rural and under-served 
communities. Such developments can assist in making rural and low-income markets profitable, 
affordable, and sustainable. Broadband wireless local loop has the potential to have significant implications 
for the delivery of USOs as discussed in more detail in another OECD paper 
(DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)4/FINAL). For instance, long-range broadband wireless local loop technology 
promises to be capable of expanding the reach of current broadband networks to remote areas and may 
significantly decrease the need for universal service subsidies.  
However, much of the discussion for broadband wireless local loop has been on deployment in high 
population/high opportunity markets. This is reflected in recent reshaping of the broadband wireless local 
loop standards to permit mobility, in order to compete with 3G mobile technologies. For the moment, there 
is little proof that technologies like broadband wireless local loop technologies are immediately leading to 
investment in rural areas. 
The success of broadband wireless local loop will depend on an environment that facilitates digital 
planning, innovation and creative business initiatives and on the availability of spectrum. Thus spectrum 
agencies should examine existing allocations to see where space can be made for new broadband wireless 
technologies such as those used by broadband wireless local loop. Consideration should also be given to 
the extent to which reforms to introduce spectrum trading and leasing can assist. This issue was examined 
in detail in another OECD paper (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2004)11/FINAL). 
With spectrum becoming an increasingly important resource, there is need to review spectrum 
allocation and management policy with a view to allowing more flexible use of spectrum, including 
spectrum trading and liberalisation. This will enable: a bigger role for the market in deciding how much 
spectrum should be allocated to different uses; faster flexible access to spectrum, including unused and 
underused spectrum; the development of new, spectrum-efficient technologies; and innovation in the use of 
the spectrum and spectrum-based products and services.  
Very small aperture terminals (VSATs) 
Very small aperture terminals (VSATs) can be another effective means of establishing 
telecommunications networks in rural areas due to their advantages over wired telecommunications in 
terms of cost and ease of installation. For example, when installing telephones in sparsely populated rural 
areas, wireless communication technologies can be used in conjunction with satellite stations to achieve 
coverage of isolated settlements over long distances.  
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Satellite systems have also been developing technologically enhancing ability to serve rural areas. 
Prices for VSATs have fallen rapidly allowing manufacturers to expand sales of VSAT systems into low-
end applications such as rural telephony. However, at this point in time, cable, fibre, and DSL technologies 
have significant bandwidth advantages over technologies like VSAT. If rural areas were to rely on VSAT, 
they might still be at a disadvantage compared to urban areas, and this may have social and economic 
consequences.  
In 1998, Peru's telecommunications regulator (FITEL) invited tenders to award a 20-year, subsidised 
concession to provide rural payphones in a number of remote regions. Participants in the tender submitted 
bids indicating the lowest government subsidy they would be willing to accept in order to build the 
network. The winning solution selected by FITEL was based on VSAT technology.19 GVT del Peru 
proposed to cover the costs of building, installing and operating the network with a government subsidy of 
USD 4 909 292 over 5 years. The remaining costs would be borne by the operator and recovered from 
service revenues. According to FITEL, the subsidy amounted to public expenditure of USD 11 per 
inhabitant.  
Power-line. Use of the power grid as a communications network  known as broadband over power 
lines (BPL) in the US, and power-line communications (PLC) in Europe  appears to be receiving 
official acceptance with the FCC approving the use of power-line technology in the United States in 
October 2004. Advocates of the technology argue that it promises several advantages offering not only 
voice but also broadband with connection speed not dependent on distance from the telephone exchange 
(as with DSL), or on the number of customers (as with cable). Also power-line promises to offer far more 
capacity than todays cable networks. Moreover, the technology will reportedly20 allow utilities to: monitor 
what is happening on their power grids in real time, down to local substations; read power and water 
meters without entering customers premises; and manage peak loads by, for example, turning down a 
residential air conditioner remotely while a customer is at the office, in return for a lower tariff.21 However, 
some dispute these advantages. For instance, the FCCs information suggests that capacity offered by 
broadband over powerline will be less than cable, DSL, and fibre.22 
Stratellite technology. Floating in the stratosphere at an altitude of about 20 km (13 miles), a 
stratellite would behave just like a geostationary satellite, hovering over a particular spot and relaying 
radio signals to and from the ground. Like satellites, these airships will be able to provide wide-area mobile 
telephone coverage, paging and other communications services. However, it is claimed that such airships 
will be much cheaper to launch and maintain than satellites and can do things that satellites cannot. 
There is considerable excitement over the prospect that stratellites could be able to provide wireless 
broadband coverage, akin to Wi-Fi, over large areas. Advocates claim that a single airship could 
potentially provide coverage over an area of about 800 000 square kilometres. It should thus be possible to 
create hot zones of coverage encapsulating entire cities and their surrounding countryside, rather than the 
smaller hotspots of Wi-Fi coverage found in airports and coffee shops. Moreover, stratellites are 
expected to cost much less than satellites (about USD 20 million each) and can be reused. After hovering 
for 18 months they can be recovered for servicing and then re-launched. 
All this is not meant to argue that the technologies mentioned above will live up to their promises. It 
is simply to argue that there is scope to move away from a definition of universal service that is linked only 
to the PSTN and to emphasise definitions based on the provision of services and characteristics of services. 
Indeed, the definition of universal service in the European Union Directive is already technologically 
neutral in that it can include other platforms other than the PSTN. Thus, markets must be kept open and 
universal service programmes should be competitive and technologically neutral to allow the most cost-
effective technology available now and in the future to be introduced to address the challenge of universal 
service (and for developing countries, the opportunity to leap-frog into the technological frontier). With 
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promising technologies on the horizon, it is crucial that barriers to entry and disincentives to invest be 
minimised. And, certainly, it argues that a preference for fixed-line operators over mobile or other 
technologies as the universal service provider makes little sense in a technologically dynamic, increasingly 
wireless era and, indeed, transgresses the principle of technological neutrality. Rather, where deemed to be 
necessary, a service to be covered under a universal service provision should be specified, with provision 
of the service allowed to occur by whatever technology is appropriate/cost-effective. This would be 
especially important in a multi-platform NGN regime. There is also no reason why universal service in 
different geographic areas of a country cannot be provided by different technologies as long as the services 
provided are functionally similar.  For this reason as well, it is not necessary that there be a single USO 
provider in a country, but there could be a number of different regional providers who provide services 
with equal functions and conditions as is foreseen in the EU Directive.   
The introduction of prepaid packages for mobile has allowed consumers to make calls without paying 
any fixed line rental. This, coupled with the near ubiquitous coverage of mobile operators, suggests that 
mobile phones may in effect already be playing a role in delivering universal voice services although in 
some countries they do not meet all the criteria of USOs e.g. they do not always provide location 
information to emergency services (although the technology exists to do so). The situation is more 
complicated where there is a requirement to provide data service as part of a USO. For instance, the 
European Commissions USO provisions require that the telecommunications connection also provides 
functional access to the Internet (defined at 28.8 kb/s). This data service might not be provided by the 
current (second) generation of mobile phones. While this facility is promised by 3G technology, 3G may 
not provide universal coverage. As such, mobile availability might not be a substitute for a fixed-line USO.   
Nonetheless, in certain circumstances (e.g. the physical geography of the location), it can be very 
costly to connect to the fixed network. Consumers in these circumstances are likely to welcome the use of 
mobile technologies to connect them to voice service, especially where (as in the United Kingdom), they 
are expected to pay for costs of fixed line connection beyond a reasonable level (GBP 7 000 in the United 
Kingdom).  
In suggesting that mobile technology be permitted to play a role in delivering USOs, the suggestion is 
not that mobile technologies should be subject to an additional USO, but that a USO couched in terms of 
basic voice and data services might be delivered through either fixed or wireless technologies or indeed a 
combination of these and other technologies. In short, the choice of technology should not be specified. A 
specification that fixed line be used may have been justified at the time it was introduced e.g. because it 
allowed provision of data services, including broadband. But other technologies are now also promising 
broadband capacity. Continuing to treat local access as an enduring bottleneck will discourage true 
infrastructure-based competition. In Europe, even though the framework specified fixed functionality, it 
did not define the type of technology employed so a priori a mobile operator could become a universal 
service operator if it can assure access to the network for households.   
3.3  Universal Service Funds 
How have regulators in the OECD sought to implement national access targets and affordability goals, 
once these have been defined? Generally, governments have imposed two types of universal service 
obligations (USOs) on operators. The first is a general obligation to provide service to all customers 
willing to pay for service at the regulated price. This obligation may be limited to certain geographic or 
population groups, such as a requirement to serve rural areas with a population above a certain level. In 
addition, policy makers and regulators have imposed obligations to extend certain types of designated 
services to a pre-specified number of subscribers or localities. These network build-out obligations are 
often incorporated in operators licences. 
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Designating Universal Service Provision  
Some examples are provided below in Box 1. 
Box 1. Some Examples of Universal Service Provider Designation 
In Austria, an auction is to be used, and if there is no tender, the USO will be designated.  
In Denmark, the USO provider is designated on the basis of market share (combined with other criteria described in 
the telecommunications directives), but the legislation also allows a public tender. 
In Germany, where a USO is not being adequately provided or there is reason to believe that such provision will not 
occur  a USO will be imposed. First, a voluntary solution, i.e. provision of the universal service without compensation, 
would be sought. Should there be no voluntary solution, the legislation gives two options: the USO may be imposed on 
the provider having a dominant position, or the USO provider would be selected by an auction process. Thus far, 
Deutsche Telekom has been the USO provider without receiving compensation. 
In Greece, the incumbent was traditionally the USO provider, but since liberalisation of the telecommunications market, 
a competitive tender mechanism may be used. 
In Ireland, the regulator re-designated the incumbent operator the USO provider following a detailed consultation 
process. A request for expressions of interest from alternative operators to become a USO provider was also made, 
but no expressions were received. 
In Mexico, the incumbent operator (Telmex) was required as part of its privatisation to install payphones in 20 000 rural 
areas over a five-year period to meet the policy goal of ensuring some telephone access in all villages with at least 500 
residents. 
In the Netherlands, the USO is awarded to the operator with the lowest net cost. 
In Norway, the USO provider is designated by the Ministry based on criteria described in the regulatory framework. 
In Switzerland, Swisscom is the designated USO provider after winning a tender (in which the operator did not ask for 
a subsidy since it considered that the intangible benefits of being the USOs provider compensated for the costs). 
In the UK, BT is the designated USO provider (Kingston, in Hull). 
Liberalisation of telecommunications markets has complicated the issue of funding USOs. First, the 
most desirable markets for new entrants were the most profitable, such as international calls and business 
calls. These were exactly the sectors where an incumbent was using cross-subsidisation to fund the 
universal service obligations. Second, because an incumbents tariffs were unbalanced  that is to say long 
distance calls were generally significantly above cost and access subsidised, new entrants could easily 
enter the market and make a profit in the long distance calls part of the market. 
As competition continues to erode high margins across a widening set of products, at some point 
providing the USO may become an unfair burden although in most countries incumbent operators have 
been allowed to increase the fixed subscriber line charge to reflect costs. Nevertheless, because of such 
developments it may become appropriate to introduce alternative mechanisms for funding and allocating 
the USO such as the use of a Universal Service Fund. Use of a Universal Service Fund, as is the case in a 
number of OECD countries, allows more flexibility than mandating a particular operator using a specific 
prescribed technology. Also a universal access fund is more transparent, the cost could be lower, and it 
could be designed to be competitively neutral (e.g. by requiring a broad range of operators to contribute to 
a Fund) and technologically neutral. Indeed, the EU Universal Service Directive requires that where a 
national regulator finds that an operator is subject to an unfair burden in providing USOs, a mechanism 
should be introduced either to compensate the USO provider(s) from public funds, or to share the net cost 
of USOs between communications providers. 
In a number of countries, such as the United States, Australia, Italy and France (but also in an 
increasing number of developing countries such as Chile, Peru, India and Uganda), a separate universal 
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service fund has been set up. In many countries, communications providers are obliged to contribute to this 
fund. In Australia, only licensed telecommunications carriers are required to contribute to the USO levy. 
This definition does not include other carriage service providers such as some resellers and Internet service 
providers (ISPs). In France, operators with a turnover above the threshold of EUR 5 million, contribute to 
the USO fund in proportion to their retail telecommunications revenue, which is then managed by the 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations. In the United States, the framework is somewhat more complicated,23 
with services designated telecommunications services, paying into a USO fund in proportion to interstate 
and international revenues. This effectively creates a transfer from long-distance carriers to local carriers. 
While the US framework has had some success in ensuring provision of USOs, it has also generated 
protracted legal battles over whether a service is designated as a telecommunications service or an 
information service (providers of which are not assessed for a contribution to the USO fund). 
In developing countries, universal access funds have placed emphasis on ensuring basic public access 
(i.e. voice-grade fixed access to the public telecommunications network). But with the growing importance 
of the Internet to national economies, some funds are also supporting public access to value-added 
services, including Internet access. In Chile, the government has redefined the UA Fund, which has been 
successful in extending basic telecommunications to rural and low-income areas, to support telecentre 
projects. In India and Kenya too, telecentres are eligible for subsidies from the universal service fund.  
Difficulties with estimating the costs of universal service 
Difficulties with estimating the intangible benefits and net cost of providing universal service have 
also plagued the designation of a universal service provider. Indeed, in Australia, the DCITA review of 
universal service concluded that the problems relating to costing USOs based on a cost-modelling 
approach: are to the point where there are significant doubts about whether the theoretical benefits of a 
cost-modelling approach are capable of being realized or captured in practice in Australia24 (p.xiv). The 
DCITA review commented that the uncertainty and radical unpredictability about USO costs itself 
feeds into the broader investment climate for the industry. (p.xiv). The review concluded that if the 
principle of general industry funding is retained, there is need to find a simpler way of determining a 
reasonable level of subsidy de-linked from a calculation of costs. (p. xvi).   
Competitive tendering 
There is accumulating evidence that in competitive circumstances with feasible alternative supply of 
universal service, competitive tendering or reverse auctions, properly designed, can generate incentives to 
contain costs, to innovate, and to reveal the true cost of delivering universal service thus minimising the 
subsidy required.25 The competitive tendering approach can reduce the arguments about the correct cost 
basis for setting subsidies as well as the asymmetric information problems of identifying the cost of 
universal service. However, while the experience with designating universal service providers on the basis 
of competitive tendering in some countries26 has been encouraging (e.g. Chile27 and Peru28), there has been 
some less positive experience in Australia. Here trials in the use of competitive tendering resulted in no 
competitive entry. Some analysts have explained that this could be due to Telstras substantial economies 
of scale in the pilot areas (and the poor investment climate at the time) that could have discouraged 
potential entrants. At any rate, the DCITA Review of the universal service obligation and customer service 
guarantee29 concluded that the experience suggests that there was probably little value in continuing the 
existing pilots beyond their end date (30 June 2004). Nevertheless, the review also found that the existence 
of the contestability arrangements had been a useful, and a reasonably cost-effective, way of testing the 
potential for contestability of USO subsidies.   
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3.4   Financing a Universal Service Fund 
In principle, a Universal Service Fund could be financed through several means, in particular:  
• Direct levy on all consumers of communications services (for example, a fixed amount that 
appears directly on the bill). 
• A direct or indirect levy on consumers (via a levy on communications providers that is passed on 
to customers i.e. the US/French model). 
• Funding from the proceeds of privatisation and spectrum licence fees. 
• Government funding via general taxation revenue. 
Contributions from operators  
Contributions from operators have been the most commonly used approach. What percentage of 
revenue should be payable by operators? This would depend importantly of course on the amount of 
subsidy funding required from the fund. In countries that have installed a universal access fund, the levy 
has ranged from 0.1% (France) to  1% (Argentina, Brazil), 5% (India), 6% (Malaysia) to over 10% (United 
States30). Box 2 below indicates some examples of required contributions from operators across a range of 
countries. Most examples are of non-OECD countries because to date, only a few OECD countries have 
installed universal service funds. 
Box 2.  Some examples of Universal Service Funds 
Country Source of Revenue Administering agency Method of allocating funds 




Government to determine based on its goal to increase 
fixed teledensity and mobile teledensity. 
Australia Levy on licensed 
operators depending 




and Media  
Authority (ACMA)
The government determines the level of subsidy paid to the 
USO provider. A USO model was previously used but 
subsidy amounts are now administratively determined, 
broadly based on previous modelled amounts.  
Brazil  1% of service 
providers gross 
operational revenues 
earned from the 





Universal Service Fund (FUST) will support ICT projects 
consistent with the governments development objectives. 
Canada All market 
participants, both 
fixed & mobile pay 
fixed % of eligible 
telecom revenue 




Universal Service Fund to compensate costs estimated on 







Subsidies distributed through competitive bidding (lowest 
bid wins). 
Colombia  5% of national and 
long distance 
operators' revenues 








Box 2.  Some examples of Universal Service Funds (contd) 
France Operators contribute 




Compensation for costs incurred by USO provider (France 
Telecom). 
Italy Contribution of 1% of 




USO provider (Telecom Italia) makes offer to provide 
services at specified cost and regulator decides what part(s) 
of offer to accept. 
Japan Telecommunications 







The universal service cost to eligible telecommunications 
carriers. 
Malaysia  Fixed and mobile 
network operators 












During an interim period (1999 to 2002), Telekom Malaysia 
was the only operator with access to funds. Starting in 2002, 
other operators were invited to submit proposals for USP 
and be compensated from the fund through a competitive 
process. 
Nepal  2% levy on the 
revenues of the 
incumbent operator, 





Subsidies distributed through competitive bidding. 







Subsidies distributed through competitive bidding (with 
lowest bid winning). 
Peru  1% of all operators' 





Subsidy goes to lowest bidder. 





unit to manage 
fund 
Subsidies mainly awarded to telecentre projects and areas 
of greatest need. 
Switzerland   USO licence publicly tendered to lowest bidder. Swisscom 
AG won bid (did not require any subsidy). 
Uganda  1% levy on all sector 
participants including 
telecom operators, 











10.2% in fourth 
quarter of 2005 on 
operators interstate 
end-user revenue 
(which can be 
passed on to 
customers as a 
Universal Service 
Fund fee levied on 







A number of programmes, including: high cost support 
mechanism; low-income support mechanism; rural health 
care support mechanism; schools and libraries support 
mechanism (E-rate). 
 
The obligation of non-universal service provider (USP) carriers to fund USPs rural and regional 
activities can have a number of negative consequences for the promotion of competition. In an 
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environment where competitive carriers are finding it hard to make inroads against the incumbent, the 
USO regime can actually require competitive carriers to cross-subsidise the USPs activities, and thus can 
strengthen the USPs position. Thus the USO contribution can act as a disincentive for competitive carriers 
to provide their own regional and rural services. This can impede prospects of alternative technologies, 
such as wireless, from entering a market even when such delivery systems are more efficient (Hazlett et 
al., p.82) This could result in universal service subsidies helping to perpetuate the maintenance of the 
oldest features of communications services, instead of providing an incentive for firms to build the most 
efficient networks.  In certain cases, the impact may be marginal insofar as the contribution from operators 
is only a negligible part of their revenue.    
Not all countries have been enthusiastic about establishing a Universal Service Fund. Indeed, in 
Finland, there are no mandated requirements on operators, with competition expected to achieve universal 
service objectives. 
In the European Union, a universal service fund may be established by a Member State if it is 
concluded that the incumbent would be significantly competitively disadvantaged by being designated the 
universal service provider. It is notable that (so far) only France, Italy and Spain have decided to establish 
such a universal service fund. But other countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) are considering this approach 
as cross-subsidisation is phased out.  
But the point that will be made in the following section of this paper is that these funding mechanisms 
for delivering and funding USOs may come under pressure, and increasingly so as we transit to Next 
Generation Networks. Indeed, in some countries, current arrangements are likely to be sustainable for no 
more than say within a decade.  
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4. CONCERNS OVER CURRENT USO ARRANGEMENTS 
4.1  Efficiency constraints on equity 
In many countries, universal service has been promoted by the cross-subsidisation of line rentals and 
local call charges from high prices in international and national long distance call revenues. As competition 
and regulation have driven prices towards costs, cross-subsidies have to a large extent been significantly 
reduced if not eliminated. New entrants are largely attracted to providing services where prices are well 
above costs (for international and long distance) avoiding local markets where prices are often below costs. 
To defend market share, incumbent operators have been forced to reduce long-distance prices thereby 
reducing the gap between prices and costs that makes them vulnerable to competitive entry. To offset the 
fall in revenue from long distance calls, incumbents have increased line rentals and frequently also local 
call charges. This is commonly referred to as price rebalancing. However, in the majority of OECD 
countries, the policy of geographic averaging of subscriber line prices has been maintained, requiring 
cross-subsidies from regions where the supply of access is profitable to less profitable regions. 
Table 1 shows the price rebalancing that has occurred in OECD countries as a whole in index form 
based on current prices. There have been significant rises in fixed charges. But usage prices have declined 
significantly for both residential as well as business users especially since 1997 although this has been 
offset to some extent by significant rises in fixed charges. The overall fall in prices has been greater for 
business users (especially large corporate users) than for residential users. These price decreases do not 
take into account the price falls made available through the price discount schemes that have been 
accessible to a growing number of both business and residential consumers.    
Table 1. OECD time series for telephone charges 
 1990 1997 2001 2003 2004 
Residential      
Fixed 100 112.97 129.13 132.21 145.23 
Usage 100 81.29 55.83 53.50 55.75 
Total 100 93.97 85.15 84.98 91.54 
      
Business      
Fixed 100 113.07 126.90 126.52 137.73 
Usage 100 86.46 55.54 54.65 56.56 
Total 100 91.78 69.82 69.02 72.80 
Source: OECD, Communications Outlook 2005, Paris 2005. 
Similar trends in price rebalancing are observable in many other countries,31 including developing 
countries. Price rebalancing has been accepted by regulators since it is recognized that higher line rentals 
and local call charges that are more reflective of costs are in accord with economic efficiency and are 
necessary to make local markets more attractive to new entrants thereby increasing 
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competition/contestability. However, price increases here are also politically unpopular and may be 
considered inequitable (unfair) since it is in these local markets that subscribers are vulnerable because 
they are unable to migrate to a competitive supplier (since none exist). Also, the largest beneficiaries of the 
price rebalancing are those who make significant international and long-distance calls  often large 
corporate users and the relatively wealthy, while the costs are borne by low users.  Thus, there may be 
universal service concerns that higher rental charges could force some consumers to become 
disconnected from the telecommunications network.  
There is also concern that sharp increases in monthly rental charges can cause customers to switch to 
mobile and/or reduce affordability and thereby threaten the quest for universal service on the fixed 
network. Some might argue that this may not be undesirable if mobile telephony is a cheaper technology to 
deploy and tariff rebalancing for fixed service makes the cheaper technology relatively more attractive. 
However, Internet connection, especially high-speed connection is still dependent largely on access to 
fixed-line service. Such concerns have led a number of countries to apply price cap regulation as a means 
of controlling the nature, extent, speed and direction of price rebalancing permitted by equity and 
political considerations. For instance, a price cap regime can limit the increase in monthly charges (e.g. to 
no more than CPI + 2%) as was done in the United Kingdom and Australia.  
Impediments to price increases in local access markets (line rental and local charges) reduce the 
incentives for market entry, market growth or maintenance of market share by new entrant service 
providers, and could reinforce an incumbents dominance in the residential access market. This is likely to 
impede universal service in these markets and the benefits that competition delivers. 
Experience in the mobile sector illustrates how flexible pricing to allow innovations (e.g. pre-pay and 
two-part tariffs) can help the market to grow. The development of the low-cost airline industry provides 
another example of a sector where substantial benefits and market growth have flowed, at least in part, 
from price flexibility. 
In general, to impede price flexibility through price regulation (such as price cap regulation, often 
with sub-caps on line rentals) because of concern over a few such consumers seems a very blunt 
inefficient instrument. It would seem more sensible to provide such consumers the requisite insulation 
through specifically targeted subsidies. As competition strengthens, one approach might be to abandon 
regulation of end-user prices, then see where and for whom subsidies may be necessary. The concern, 
however, might be the disruption and impact on the needy in the interim.  There are provisions in several 
OECD countries that allow for a reduction in subscription charges for people with a low income and in 
some cases (e.g. Belgium) the provision is extended to other communication services (mobile services).    
4.2  Wireless, VoIP, revenue erosion and the reducing sustainability of Universal Service Funds 
The impact of competition from wireless telecommunications on the revenue of fixed-line operators 
has already received considerable attention elsewhere. For instance, in the United Kingdom, there has been 
an average decline of nearly 2% in the number of geographic voice call minutes from fixed-line phones 
since 2000. This compares with annual average growth in the number of mobile voice call minutes of 17%. 
The above figure excludes SMS services, which would have reduced other means of communication, 
including fixed calls. Relative growth rates have pushed mobile call minutes to about 28% of total voice 
call minutes, compared with 4% in 1997. One prediction is that, by 2009, about 50% of voice call minutes 
in Western Europe will be generated using mobile phones.32  
The data below show some of the developments impacting on fixed-line operators.  Figure 1 shows 
that mobile penetration in OECD countries has risen sharply between 2002 and 2004, while standard 
analogue fixed-line penetration has declined since about 2000. The increasing use of prepaid cards for 
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mobile service has helped support the sharp increase in mobile penetration.  Figure 2 shows that in many 
OECD countries, the number of mobile subscribers increased faster than fixed line during 2002-2004. 
Indeed, in most OECD countries, the number of fixed line subscribers has declined in absolute terms. One 
factor contributing to the decline in the number of fixed line subscribers is the increasing number of 
mobile only households.  Certainly, the number of such households has been increasing in the EU15 
countries, as Figure 3 indicates.  Figure 4 shows the impact of the different rates of subscribership growth 
on revenue. Revenue from mobile service has been increasing sharply, while growth in the revenue from 
fixed line has remained relatively steady. 
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The impact of competition from VoIP on fixed-line operators is becoming increasingly apparent not 
only in the international voice market but also more recently in domestic long distance and local markets. 
One forecast is that by 2008 over 1 in 10 of broadband-enabled households worldwide and over 1 in 5 
broadband-enabled small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will be making VoIP calls. The Analysys 
forecasts are shown below in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Adoption of VoIP by broadband users (% of broadband sites) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Residential penetration        
Access & calls 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 2.6% 3.2% 3.9% 4.5% 
Calls only 0.5% 2.5% 4.5% 5.4% 5.6% 5.1% 4.1% 
DIY VoIP (or P2P) 1.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 2.0% 2.7% 3.9% 
Total 2.2% 4.9% 7.6% 9.5% 10.8% 11.7% 12.5% 
        
SME penetration        
Access & calls 0.5% 2.0% 4.9% 9.5% 14.1% 18.3% 22.0% 
Calls only 0.3% 2.1% 4.2% 5.5% 6.1% 6.4% 6.6% 
DIY VoIP (or P2P) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 0.8% 4.1% 9.1% 15.0% 20.2% 24.7% 28.6% 
Note: P2P = Peer-to-peer calls that offer users more limited access. 
Source: Analysys, The Impact of Voice over Broadband, June 2004. 
Other commentators believe there will be higher levels of adoption than those shown in Table 2.  
According to a report33 released in May 2005, consumer and small business usage of VoIP will accelerate 
between 2005 and 2009. As VoIP competition and demand increase, incumbent carriers will increasingly 
opt for PSTN replacement to lower operating costs.  
The new technologies could result in prices falling to very low levels. Analysts are predicting major 
changes to tariff structures for voice services as a result of VoIP and NGN. It may be increasingly common 
for customers to buy large buckets of calls at a flat rate,34 rather than paying per call. Some VoIP 
customers do not pay for the number of calls made, but instead pay a flat-rate charge for unlimited calls 
along the current model for broadband Internet. It is widely predicted that telecommunications operators 
increasingly will not sell calls as a stand-alone service. Some analysts predict that voice calls might even 
be provided free, bundled in with broadband Internet access and other services (such as firewall protection 
and security). For instance, in the United States a broadband telephony company, Vonage, has offered 
unlimited local and long-distance calling packages for less than USD 35 per month.  
These changes could result in a very different voice market. In an NGN future, there is likely to be 
vigorous competition to supply access to consumers  from an incumbent, cable operators, operators using 
local loop unbundling (LLU), mobile operators, fixed wireless access suppliers and others. Over these 
various access mechanisms, packages of services are already offered  such as instant messaging, e-mail, 
and content services  of which voice will only be one application.  
An increasing switch to VoIP could diminish the core revenues of traditional telecommunications 
operators (despite the fact that the growth in broadband usage is giving a new revenue stream to operators 
whether from wholesale demand for unbundled lines/bitstream or from retail demand).  
It is possible that network transformation could change the balance of revenues and costs (e.g. a shift 
between access services and conveyance services; changes in the net cost of serving different consumer 
groups or regions. At the same time, changes in the competitive environment may put considerable 
pressure on prices for particular consumer groups and/or geographic areas. 
Nomadicity. A VoIP provider can offer service from another country, without being physically present 
in a country. Because service can be provided independently of a fixed DSL line at home, the end 
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customer, with a VoIP phone, can use the service wherever a broadband connection is available. Thus, 
VoIP services offer a nomadic service enabling end-users to make and receive calls at numerous 
locations nationally and internationally, generally with the same service number. For example, the 
customer is able when travelling to make and receive calls at various locations providing broadband 
access, such as airports and cafes providing wireless local networks access. As a result, this type of VoIP 
service breaks the nexus between a persons telephone number and their location, that characterises fixed 
telephony service.35 
Initially reluctant to cannibalise their own voice services, incumbents, alarmed by developments in 
the use of VoIP, have been joining the move to VoIP offering service to both business and residential 
customers. 
A number of VoIP service providers are requesting numbers (either geographic or non-geographic) to 
allow for telephone-to-telephone calling.36 These services may also be nomadic in the sense that the 
subscriber to a geographic number may not in fact live in or call from the area where the geographic 
number is located. Nevertheless, for these services the requirement for a number allows, if deemed 
necessary, the imposition of a contribution for universal service.  
4.3  Migration to NGN and reduced viability/sustainability of PSTN in rural and remote areas 
As traffic migrates to IP networks there will be fewer customers generating PSTN revenue from voice 
service. At some stage in the future, the PSTN could become uneconomical to maintain, especially if the 
more lucrative customers are the earlier movers to NGN networks. The transition from PSTN to NGN is 
unlikely to take place evenly across customer groups or geographies. Customers remaining on the old 
network are likely to be clustered in poorer locations and demographic groups. As a result, this transition 
could raise concerns in that it may create a digital divide between those with NGN access and those still 
using the PSTN. In the strict context of universal service, changes to network characteristics and services 
will not have an impact as long as the definition of universal service remains unchanged. 
Access deficit charges and Asymmetric interconnection charges are unsustainable. Some 
countries have used so-called Access Deficit charges to compensate an operator for maintaining high 
cost networks. In some developing countries (Chile and Peru, for example, although other countries are 
considering this approach), asymmetric interconnection fees are being used to increase the revenue from 
rural service. In short, higher interconnection charges are levied for termination in rural and remote areas 
to reflect the higher costs of providing termination service in these areas. Asymmetric interconnection 
regimes can be of particular importance to rural operators. Since rural operators income can be largely 
based on incoming calls, asymmetric interconnection rates can affect financial viability and can reduce 
dependence on government subsidies. 
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5. RETHINKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE FOR NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS  
5.1  What services should be covered by USOs in an NGN environment? 
Arguments for assistance to uneconomic subscribers, justified by social reasons, or more generally, 
by universal service policies, must be constrained by the need not to impose unreasonable costs on other 
(economic) subscribers. In addition, in determining the scope of universal service, care should be exercised 
not to raise damaging uncertainty in the minds of operators and investors. To endeavour to minimise these 
and other potential costs and to maximise the potential benefits derivable, it is crucial that policies and 
programmes be determined judiciously and systematically. While all this suggests that USO programmes 
be subjected to thorough cost-benefit analysis, this is seldom done. 
While there will be broad agreement that in seeking to maximise the benefits of NGN, it is important 
that equity is not forgotten, the converse also applies. That is, in striving to achieve equity in access to 
NGN, it is important that efficient and cost-effective means for doing so are sought.  
In the existing PSTN environment, services delivered through universal service policy are uniform 
(namely POTS) and standardised solutions are implemented nationwide. With the expansion of new 
services expected in an NGN environment (see Box 3), services may no longer be tied to the network but 
be an application where there would be a range of choices rather than standardised services. This could 
imply that policy makers need to choose a minimum number of characteristics to describe a service that 
will become part of universal service obligations. If there is a wide choice of similar services (e.g. voice) 
the question is whether a single provider of such a service application should be designated as the USO 
provider or should it be left to the market to provide services?  
Services offered in an NGN environment 
Various technologies are expected to coexist in NGN. They will both compete with one another 
(facility-based competition) and complement each other, resulting in hybrid technological solutions 
expected to facilitate widespread coverage. New technologies, including advances in wireless technologies, 
the transition to NGNs through horizontal integration (see Figure 5) and convergence (see Figure 6) are 
promising platform-based competition with a profusion of innovation and service differentiation, cost 
efficient networks with IP at its core and increasing use of wireless technology in the access network to 
provide fully converged fixed and mobile services resulting in a ubiquitous network society.37  
While NGN promises a variety of broadband technologies supporting platform-based competition, 
the emerging technologies differ in capabilities and costs. Thus, platform based competition will be 
asymmetric in nature with different platforms offering varying service capabilities and levels of 
competitiveness affected by demographic and other factors. Simply, within a specific marketplace, 
competition may favour only a few, or even a single platform and, similarly, only a few or even a single 
NGN provider. The effect of asymmetric platforms on the competitive environment needs to be studied. 
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Box 3. NGN is expected to support a wide variety of services 
Voice telephony  NGNs will likely need to support various existing voice telephony services (e.g. call waiting, call 
forwarding, 3-way calling, various AIN features, various Centrex features, and various CLASS features). But NGNs will 
not try to duplicate each and every traditional voice telephony service currently offered. Rather, they will likely attempt 
to support only a small percentage of these traditional services, with an initial focus on the most marketable voice 
telephony features and the features required from a regulatory perspective. 
Data (Connectivity) services  allows for the real-time establishment of connectivity between end points, along with 
various value-added features (e.g. bandwidth-on-demand, connection reliability/resilient Switched Virtual Connections, 
and bandwidth management/call admission control). 
Multimedia Services  allows multiple parties to interact using voice, video, and/or data. This allows customers to 
converse with each other while displaying visual information. It also allows for collaborative computing and groupware. 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)  voice VPNs improve the interlocation networking capabilities of businesses by 
allowing large, geographically dispersed organizations to combine with their existing private networks with portions of 
the PSTN thus providing subscribers with uniform capabilities. Data VPNs provide added security and networking 
features that allow customers to use a shared IP network as a VPN. 
Public network computing  provides public network-based computing services for businesses and consumer. For 
example, the public network provider could provide generic processing and storage capabilities (e.g. to host a web 
page, store/maintain/backup data files, or run a computing application). 
Unified Messaging  supports the delivery of voice mail, email, fax mail, and pages through common interfaces 
independent of the means of access (i.e. wireline or mobile phone, computer, or wireless data device).  
Information Brokering  involves advertising, finding, and providing information to match consumers with providers. For 
example, consumers could receive information based on pre-specified criteria or based on personal preferences and 
behaviour patterns. 
E-commerce  allows consumers to purchase goods electronically over the network. 
Call Centre Services 
Inter-active gaming 
Distributed virtual reality 
Home managerwith the advent of in-home networking and intelligent appliances, these services could monitor and 
control home security systems, energy systems, home entertainment systems, and other home appliances. 





Source: Yasu Taniwaki, Broadband Deployment in Japan: Challenges for u-Japan, Progressive Policy Institute, November 2004.  
Layering 
The layered network model implicit in all IP networks (depicted in Figure 7) is essentially the 
separation between the transmission and control layers on the one hand and the service creation layers on 
the other hand. The technical configuration of the service layer and the network on which it rides may have 
policy implications for the future that regulators should consider, such as issues of network access and 
control and how network neutrality is to be defined.        
As Figure 7 illustrates, IP services depend on a physical infrastructure layer.38 In other words, VoIP 
service providers cannot deliver their services without infrastructure provided by facility-based carriers. 
And broadband Internet access will be even more important to facilitate access to VoIP and the full range 
of NGN services.   
Currently, broadband access is mostly offered via legacy infrastructure, DSL technology and cable 
TV networks using cable modems. But broadband access can also be offered over new infrastructure, both 
fixed and wireless. The advantage of new platforms is that they can offer almost unlimited bandwidth 
(fibre optic), flexibility (WLAN), coverage (satellite), and access on the move (3G and beyond). Wireless 
technologies are emerging as attractive alternatives for the coverage of rural and remote areas, where the 





Source: Yasu Taniwaki, Broadband Deployment in Japan: Challenges for u-Japan, Progressive Policy Institute, November 2004. 
When telecommunications access can be provided over a variety of alternative means, using universal 
service contributions to support a single technology platform (wireline) would seem a violation of the 
technological and competitive neutrality that can yield further improvements in the availability, quality and 
price.  
The essential need is that access facility of some kind can be obtained and maintained. In a converged 
NGN network, there should be no differentiation between the types of technology used to access the 
network. And because consumers are diverse in regard to their circumstances and requirement for NGN 
services, as far as possible they should have the flexibility to select what is for them the most attractive 
service provider(s). In the future, residential consumers and SMEs will probably pay a capital sum and 
line rental for access through a technology that will provide the speed of service they require and on top 
of this be charged for the amount of data they transfer. Within this overall telecommunications capacity, 
service operators will compete to provide voice, data, video, gaming, streaming audio, conferencing and 
remote working services. As the distinction between fixed and mobile access to telecommunications 
becomes increasingly blurred, it is likely that service provision will become a cross-platform mechanism 
that ensures the delivery and support of applications and content to consumers as and when required.  In 
this context USOs may need to focus on providing customers with access that supports a given range of 
services and, in particular, provides location-based emergency services (see below). 
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Figure 7. Architectural Layering in NGN 
 
Source: Australian Communications Industry Forum, Policy and Regulatory Considerations for New and Emerging Services, Final 
Report, Canberra, July 2004.  
This layered view of NGN must be subject to questioning and tested against other market-based 
scenarios. Is it likely that NGN service providers will offer unbundled access and allow unfettered 
competition at a service level? When some broadband access technologies have limited bandwidth by 
comparison with other technologies (e.g. BPL vs. fibre to the home), might infrastructure providers reserve 
a majority of bandwidth and other resources for NGN services they intend to bring to market? Where 
vertical integration exists, what marketing or technical mechanisms may impede competition? Does the 
functional unbundling proposed in Figure 7 align with the business models implied in NGN architectures 
brought to standards organisations such as the ITU? 
5.2  Can present USO services be maintained in an NGN environment? 
What about the other services that have long been designated under USOs? It is possible that some 
services in the current suite of USOs may be difficult and/or costly to replicate in an IP-based NGN. Some 
of these services are discussed below.  
Quality of service 
There are problems associated with VoIP that are not present for PSTN calls, including reliable access 
to emergency services, interruptions to normal service and reliance on the power supply to maintain the 
service. Moreover, for VoIP services using the Internet can suffer from a number of technical problems 
related to using the Internet such as jitter on the line, access difficulties, virus attack, security, etc. These 
problems may be less likely to appear from broadband access providers who offer VoIP on dedicated links.     
As a consequence industry should be encouraged to develop self-regulation to implement consumer 
protection and education measures i.e. labelling of equipment and services and marketing practices, in 
order to help ensure that consumers are provided with sufficient and clear information about the limitations 
and capabilities of IP telephony services before contracts are signed. 
A problem with ensuring quality of service is that the infrastructure access provider is only supplying 
a carriage service at the IP packet level and could be unaware of the contents of the IP packets or IP 
applications being provisioned over its access link. Therefore, regulators should be wary of imposing 
regulations for carriage services onto the infrastructure access provider that require or imply knowledge of 




Traditional wireline and wireless public telecommunications operators generally provide a service that 
routes emergency calls to the nearest emergency call centre over dedicated emergency lines. However, the 
emergency calling capabilities available through some VoIP services may not provide the reliability, caller 
identification and proper routing generally understood to exist with traditional telephony.  
There have been difficulties in bridging traditional phones with those using VoIP technology that 
allow an Internet connection to double as a phone line. In the face of these difficulties, some net-phone 
companies have implemented less-effective ways of routing 911 calls. Rather than being routed via 
dedicated emergency lines directly to trained emergency dispatchers, the calls have frequently been relayed 
to administrative lines at call centres, which may not be manned full time and require time to transfer the 
calls (if it is possible to do so) to trained emergency dispatchers. The concern is that in an emergency, the 
few seconds lost could be the difference between life and death. 
Some blame the difficulties faced by VoIP providers on the nascent state of the technology needed to 
route Internet phone calls over the traditional, dedicated, copper-based phone infrastructure serving 
emergency dispatch centres. Because some VoIP calls can be made from any Internet connection in the 
world, a major question to be faced is how to provide dispatchers with information regarding the caller's 
location, which generally is provided with traditional 911 calls.  
The approach taken by two OECD countries in addressing this issue (the United States and Canada) 
are of interest.  
United States. In the United States, calls to 911 with traditional phones generally provide emergency 
service dispatchers with the caller's number and location. Not all Internet-based phone providers have 
obtained full access to the systems connecting those calls to dedicated emergency lines and location 
information is not always available. In May 2005, the FCC adopted rules requiring interconnected VoIP 
providers to provide 911 service.40 In the United States, VoIP providers have not obtained unrestricted 
access to the dedicated emergency lines that are used to route calls to the nations approximately 6 100 
emergency calling centres. So they still cannot always successfully route a 911 call to the right emergency 
calling centre via dedicated emergency lines. Further, some interconnected VoIP providers cannot provide 
emergency operators with the caller's phone number and location. A number of interconnected VoIP 
providers have, however, concluded agreements with the big local telephone carriers for their customers 
who dial 911 to be connected to the dedicated emergency lines to emergency call centres and have 
developed means of obtaining and delivering the callers phone number and location. 
Canada. In April 2005, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) 
announced its decision that VoIP service providers had to offer emergency 911 services comparable to 
incumbent carriers. In its decision, the CRTC said VoIP service providers must notify customers about any 
limitations to their emergency services, as well as make sure their subscribers acknowledge they are aware 
of limitations. The CRTC also requires that all VoIP providers provide ongoing customer notification 
during service provisioning, by issuing warning stickers to be placed on telephone sets, through any 
subsequent advertising and billing inserts.  
The CRTC distinguished between three types of VoIP service that will be required to offer emergency 
services. These include fixed VoIP service where users can only place a telephone call from the location 
where their service is being provided, nomadic VoIP where calls can be made from any location that offers 
Internet access, and foreign exchange VoIP service, which allows users in one exchange to receive 
telephone calls dialled as local calls in another exchange. Fixed providers must offer either enhanced or 
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basic 911 services, while nomadic or foreign exchange must simply provide an interim solution with basic 
911 services.  
Hong Kong, China. In Hong Kong, China, the Telecommunications Authority concluded that IP 
Telephony providers supplying the broadband connection to the customer or service providers that assign 
their customers with numbers from the Hong Kong Numbering Plan should be required to provide 
customers with free access to emergency services. For other services, provision of free access to 
emergency services is optimal.41 
Directory assistance and phone books 
Telephone customers are used to finding numbers by looking them up in a book or telephoning a 
Directory Assistance service. To some extent this has become easier in an IP environment where Internet 
services provide directory assistance.  However, for nomadic VoIP services centralised number resources 
are difficult to obtain. 
In Hong Kong, the Telecommunications Authority decided that provision of directory enquiry service 
and printed directory to customers free of charge should be a mandatory requirement for IP Telephony 
providers supplying broadband connection to customers. Such service providers should incorporate the 
directory information of its customers such as names and telephone numbers into the unified directory 
database. It would be voluntary for other service providers whether to offer the directory enquiry service 
and printed directory to their customers.42 
Disability  
The widespread availability of text over IP capabilities is likely to facilitate the use of this service by 
deaf users. The use of mainstream services means that users do not have to negotiate for special equipment 
and a broader community of users can be contacted. Regulators should consider measures that will 
promote the availability of Text over IP in stand alone VoIP phones and in PC-based software programmes 
that provide VoIP capability. 
In the United Kingdom, a number of respondents to Ofcoms Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications: Phase 2 consultation argued that Ofcom should extend USOs to telecommunications 
equipment as well as services, including requirements that the needs of disabled people be built into next 
generation networks from the design stage. And Ofcom itself argued that the open specification of new IP-
based networks provides a significant opportunity for providers to design and deliver special services 
independent of the usual telecommunications operator product development process New networks 
provide an opportunity for service providers to adopt a design for all approach and ensure that services 
are accessible to all users from the outset. Thus, the needs of disabled users can be accommodated early in 
the design process and thus reduce the cost of providing special services post facto. There is also an 
opportunity to address any limitations of existing requirements and to revisit the overall approach taken.43   
5.3  Could USOs cover only access to telecommunications infrastructure rather than services? 
Universal service is generally based on the assumption that consumers use network access at a fixed 
location for voice-related (and, in the European Union, also basic functional Internet access) that are 
provided over the public switched telephone network (PSTN). This assumption is in turn based on a 
vertically integrated model whereby the universal service provider is usually also the provider of the 
telecommunications network infrastructure. The growth of IP-based services, in particular VoIP services, 
may challenge this vertically integrated model, since those with a broadband connection could have access 
to a range of competing IP voice service providers. In such a scenario, availability and affordability of 
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(cheap) voice service (now only one of many applications provided on networks) becomes less of an issue, 
and the focus of universal service might move towards provision of an affordable broadband access link.44 
The development of Internet Protocol (IP) technology allows delivery of a number of previously 
separate communications services using only one transmission platform. Internet-based communications 
allow consumers greater choice in selecting service providers. Accordingly, the question arises as to 
whether in the future access to the infrastructure itself would suffice as a universal service, on the grounds 
that competitive provision of services (e.g. telephone service provided using Voice over IP) will ensure 
their availability and affordability.  
Not surprisingly, the response to this question has varied, since future developments in NGN remain 
uncertain. For instance, it has been noted that in the United States, the infrastructure providers are also 
service providers and that this affects the competitive environment for other service providers. While in the 
past broadband access has primarily meant access to the Internet, now it is increasingly a bundle of 
services  video, voice, data, and mobility  that may become the most competitive business model. 
Infrastructure providers may choose to leverage their position in the market by reserving capacity for their 
exclusive use and making available only a fraction of it for Internet access. In other words, going forward 
it cannot be assumed that broadband access in the future will necessarily mean unfettered access to service 
providers. 
Box 4 summarises some considerations relating to the provision of USOs in an NGN environment.  
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Box 4. Rethinking USOs in an NGN environment 
Current USO Will service be provided in 
NGN if not a USO provision? 
What could be done to 
maintain present USO? 
Expand USO? 







A broadband subscriber can 
access VoIP probably at a low 
price bundled with broadband 
subscription. However, 
consumers without access to 
broadband dependent on 
increasingly obsolete (as 
transition to NGN progresses) 
voice service from PSTN or 
wireless. 
For those without access to 
wireless or VoIP service, it 
would be possible to oblige a 
PSTN operator to continue 
service (but also 
allow/encourage entry of 
alternative technology 
providers) in rural and remote 
areas.  
 
Include mobile service in USO? 
Not in the sense of mandating 
universal availability. But a USO 
defined in terms of basic voice 
(and data?) service without 
specifying the means would 
allow technology-neutrality and 
flexibility for USO to be cost-
effectively delivered by fixed 
wireless, mobile or other means.  
Public 
payphones. 
Fixed and mobile diffusion, 
Internet cafes, etc., could make 
it unnecessary for an USO 
obligation requiring blanket 
national coverage with a large 
number of payphones.  
Regulators could continue to 
oblige public payphones to be 
provided as a USO but this will 
be increasingly costly due to 
decreased usage and revenue 
generated from payphones. 
Nevertheless, provision of 
public payphones in specific 
locations  such as hospitals, 
prisons, emergency contact 
points on roadways, places 
where mobile coverage is 
absent or where mobile usage 
is forbidden  may continue 
to be necessary.  
Encourage/subsidise commercial 
operation of telecentres, 
including provision of subsides to 
needy to support affordability of 
access to telecentres in rural and 
remote areas; this would be 
consistent with objective of 
universal access.   In certain 
cases the provision of a 
telecentre may be less expensive 




Quality of large range of value-
added NGN services may be 
left to competitive 
provision/choice. Extent of 
quality of service depends on 
the NGN system that develops 
in 5-10 years time (although at 
present subject to Internet 
problems of jitter, security,   
delay, power outage, security, 
virus attacks, etc). One 
problem is that infrastructure 
access provider only supplying 
a carriage service at the IP 
packet level may be unaware 
of the content of IP packets or 
IP applications being 
provisioned over its access 
link. Moreover,  quality of 
service is often subjective and 
one could envisage having 
services of different quality.   
 
Might need to specify that 
certain services meet quality 
standards. USO concern is 
with ensuring access of a 
minimum capacity/speed that 
allows access to NGN 
services.   
 Consumer protection 
regulation could be amended 
to establish a set of quality of 
service benchmarks for the 
measurement of voice quality 
that would be equally 
applicable to all voice services, 
including mobile and VoIP.  
 
Any lower quality of service 
features of VoIP service should 
be made transparent to 
consumers (who could then 
make informed choices on the 
basis of such information).  
 
Methods could be devised to 
allow consumers to readily 
ascertain whether an IP service 
meets minimum QoS 
requirements. For example, one 
approach is to allocate numbers 
with more digits to voice services 







Uncertain since provision of 
emergency contact service 
could be a problem for VoIP 
(and also for mobile). 
Can require (as in US and 
Canada) that NGN operators 
provide emergency service. 
Analysts consider that if 




Box 4. Rethinking USOs in an NGN environment (contd) 
Current USO Will service be provided in 
NGN if not a USO 
provision? 
What could be done to 






Will probably be 
commercially provided.  
If necessary, obligations in 
relation to directories and 
directory assistance could be 
specified (and could be varied 
depending on type of operator). 
  
 




Services to the 
hearing, sight 
etc., impaired e.g. 
relay service that 
translates voice 
into text for 
hearing impaired. 
Yes, to extent required by 
general legislation 
concerning assurance of 
service to disabled. 
Moreover, the widespread 
availability of text over IP 
capabilities will facilitate the 
use of this service by deaf 
and hearing-impaired users.  
Regulators could require 
measures to ensure availability 
of text over IP in stand alone 
VoIP phones and in PC-based 
software programs providing 
VoIP capability. Likewise 
schemes to aid other disabled 
e.g. special format telephone 
bills for blind or partially 
sighted, priority fault repair 
service.  
 
New NGN networks provide 
an opportunity for service 
providers to adopt a design 
for all approach to ensure that 
the needs of disabled users 
can be accommodated early in 
the design process and thus 
reduce the cost of providing 
special services.  
Affordability No. But some question 
whether Voice service will be 
cheap and affordable to all 
(boosted by pre-paid) except 
the very poor. At any rate it is 
questionable if the USO 
should be regarded as a 
solution for the problem of 
poverty. In this view, such 
consumers unable to afford 
services in a competitive 
market require support 
through the welfare system, 
not USO schemes?   
 
Affordability could be 
maintained as a USO 
provision.  
Affordability could be enhanced 
by targeted direct subsidies to 
needy consumers e.g. through 
pre-paid vouchers (that allow 
them to choose services and 




Affordability could be 
enhanced by targeted direct 
subsidies to needy consumers 
(that allow them to make own 
choice of services and service 
providers in a competitively 
and technology-neutral way). 
Affordability of broadband a 
problem (see below). 
Government subsidies on 
basis of income thresholds 
rather than low usage proxies 




(which is a 
provision in the 
EU Directive on 
USOs). 
Broadband, required for 
access to VoIP and full range 
of NGN services, is 
increasing considerably in 
many countries.  
If USOs approach to 
broadband deemed necessary, 
can use geographic averaging, 
competitive tendering, etc. But 
rather than on services, focus 
could be on adequate access 
to platform(s) to enable access 
to NGN services to be pursued 
through competition, 
complemented with targeted 
subsidies, leaving choice of 
platform, capacity/speed and 
services to consumers.   
Inclusion of broadband as a 
USO provision? No, at least 
not yet (see more detailed 
discussion elsewhere in this 
paper). A policy decision that 
broadband not be part of 
universal service does not 
undermine case for policies to 
encourage competitive 
provision of broadband 
coupled with broadband 
diffusion policies to address 
the digital divide. 
 
5.4  Should broadband be part of USOs?  
The question of whether USOs should include broadband was discussed in detail in a previous OECD 
paper (DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2002)4/FINAL).45 It is pertinent to briefly revisit the issue here since in 
rethinking universal access to the range of NGN services, it turns out that the core issue is whether access 
to high-speed networks (broadband) should be part of USOs. As noted earlier, the EU has already included 
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data access (albeit at low speeds) in the definition of USO with a Functional Internet Access provision in 
its current USO Directive. Does functional access in an NGN environment necessitate an upgrade to 
broadband access? No doubt there will be close examination of whether this provision should be upgraded 
to include broadband access. Indeed, there are already strident calls for such a policy.46 Is it appropriate (or 
necessary) to use such a blanket, blunt USO approach to support broadband diffusion?  
Criteria for appraising USO status  
How can the need to apply a universal service provision to a particular service (e.g. broadband) be 
appraised? The first step is to review criteria that have been proposed for use in appraising services that 
qualify for USO status. 
In the United States, the threshold legal requirement triggering a decision that a service must be 
supported relates to the four factors outlined in section 254(c)(1) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act: 
(i) the service is essential to education, public health, or public safety; (ii) the service is subscribed to by 
a substantial majority of residential customers; (iii) the service is being deployed in public 
telecommunications networks; and (iv) the decision to support the service is in the public interest. 
Satisfaction of the four criteria does not necessarily require a decision that a service must be added to the 
list of supported services. Instead, before deciding whether to include or remove telecommunications 
services from the definition of supported services, the statute requires that the extent to which such services 
satisfy the four criteria be considered. 
The Australian Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics suggested a five-step 
framework for considering a possible contender for an upgraded USO that involved: 
i) Adequately identifying and defining the product. 
ii) Determining that the product is sufficiently essential to justify the major policy interventions 
associated with a USO designation. 
iii) Determining that costs are reasonable relative to benefits. 
iv) Finding a practical and efficient implementing mechanism. 
v) Working through any likely effects on other policy goals.  
In Japan, the scope of universal service is to be periodically reviewed (approximately every two to 
three years) taking into consideration: 
i) The degree of popularisation of the service. 
ii) The social need for the service. 
iii) Technological advances. 
In Switzerland, a working group set up to undertake a comprehensive review of the scope of universal 
service is to report by 30 June 2006. The review is to include an examination of the potential to remove 
some services from universal service obligations as well as the need to include new services within the 
scope of universal service.  
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EU review of the scope of USOs 
In Europe, the ECs Directive on Universal Service and Users Rights47 concluded that the scope of 
universal service should not be extended to include higher bandwidth services (at this stage of its 
development). However, the Directive requires that the European Commission carry out a review of the 
scope of universal service obligations within two years of 2003.  
In considering whether the scope of universal service obligations should be changed or re-defined, the 
Commission is required to take into consideration the following elements: 
• Are the specific services available to and used by a majority of consumers and does the lack of 
availability or non-use by a minority of consumers result in social exclusion? 
• Does the availability and use of the specific services convey a general net benefit to all 
consumers such that public intervention is warranted in circumstances where the specific services 
are not provided to the public under normal commercial circumstances? 
In proposing any change or re-definition of the scope of universal service obligations, the 
Commission may: 
• Propose a change or re-definition of the scope of universal service obligations but require that 
any net costs are financed only via general government budgets. 
• Propose a change or re-definition of the scope of universal service obligations and permit any net 
costs to be financed by mechanisms in conformity with the EU Directive. 
• Propose that specific services should become mandatory services to be provided under cost-
oriented obligations. 
In May 2005, the European Commission issued Communication COM (2005) 203, On the Review of 
the Scope of Universal Service in accordance with Article 15 of the Directive 2002/22/EC. This document 
sought to launch a broader policy debate on universal service provision in view of the overall assessment 
of the EU regulatory package for e-communications scheduled for 2006.  
A systematic process for considering USO status for broadband 
Drawing on the range of issues and the criteria proposed above, Box 5 indicates a framework for 
systematically considering whether to re-define the USO to include broadband. 
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Box 5. A systematic procedure for considering USO status for broadband 
A systematic process for considering the need to re-define USO should include: 
1. Consideration of whether broadband is an essential service of significant social importance. 
2. Estimation of the degree of expected market penetration of broadband service. 
3. Assessment of the nature and extent to which broadband will not be made available by the market and why. 
4. Identification and specification of objectives and desired outcomes clearly and specifically. 
5. Assessment of the extent to which market demand and delivery can/will meet the specified objectives. 
6. Consideration of the social and economic disadvantages incurred by those without access to broadband if there is 
no government intervention in this expected market situation. 
7. Estimation of the costs of intervention to widen broadband deployment through the use of the USO mechanism. 
8. Estimation of the costs of intervention through the use of the USO mechanism compared against the use of other 
approaches to establish that the USO mechanism is superior. 
9. Establishment that the benefits of intervention through the USO exceed the costs of doing so, taking into account 
the incidence of such benefits and costs (especially those on unsubsidised telecommunications/Internet/broadband 
Internet customers); and of effects on other communications and broader policy objectives. (Intervention should only 
occur where overall benefits persuasively outweigh overall costs and where a substantial increase in the level of USO 
expenditure would not result.) 
Broadband as a part of USOs  some sceptical views 
It is likely that some would regard an upgrade to broadband as a natural extension of functional 
Internet access in an NGN era. So it may be constructive to balance such views by offering some sceptical 
views here. 
Broadband access unevenness symptomatic of a broader divide? 
There are those who argue that concerns about a broadband access are no different from other 
technology divides with different rates of diffusion according to household/individual by income, 
education, location, age, gender.48 For instance, they point to the fact that subscribers to cable TV include a 
large representation of lower-income families to support the argument that when people view broadband to 
be as important as cable TV, they will find a way to pay for the entertainment it provides. They consider 
that market forces appear to be delivering broadband deployment at a reasonable pace and broadband 
prices are falling.  
Indeed, they point out that although in some countries broadband services will be available for over 
98% of subscriber lines by the end of the year (e.g. the United Kingdom), the majority of Internet users are 
still currently using a narrowband service to connect to the Internet. By the end of 2003 there were, on 
average for the OECD, 22 Internet subscribers to fixed networks per 100 inhabitants of which dial-up 
subscribers accounted for 68%. In 1999 dial-up subscribers accounted for 99% of Internet subscribers to 
the fixed network.  Although broadband penetration rates are growing rapidly the OECD average is 
relatively low at 12 subscribers per 100 inhabitants (with only 4 OECD countries having a penetration rate 
over 20%).  Even though prices are dropping, a broadband subscription still requires a premium over a 
dial-up subscription.  Given present rates of broadband penetration, it would be difficult to argue that 
broadband meets the criteria mentioned earlier which would result in it being classified as an essential 
service.     
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Some have pointed out that the broadband divide is a symptom of much deeper social, economic and 
educational gaps that have long existed. They ask why special programmes should be put in place for 
broadband Internet access? Where, for equity reasons, certain socio-demographic groups are deemed to 
require assistance, why should special broadband subsidies for these groups exist as a separate regime 
outside means-tested, targeted, general welfare programmes.  
It is notable that a number of studies have shown that a blanket universal service system can 
actually benefit high-income users as opposed to those on low incomes. It is unfair and potentially 
damaging to the development of the telecommunications sector.49   
Benefits have not been shown to persuasively exceed costs 
In general, across the OECD, with the exception of some countries, local switches have been 
upgraded relatively rapidly to support xDSL technology. This has occurred without the need to designate 
broadband as part of universal service. Many incumbents have indicated that by the end of 2006 a high 
percentage of main distribution frames will be able to support xDSL. For the relatively small percentage of 
lines which cannot be upgraded to xDSL, or the percentage of the population that cannot be provided with 
broadband, other solutions need to be found. In some cases these solutions may be forthcoming through 
Wi-Fi, and in the future may be available through broadband wireless local loop technology. At any rate, it 
appears that at this stage of network development the market seems to have been able to provide significant 
broadband coverage without the need to have broadband designated as an USO. Moreover, it is too early to 
determine whether the market will be able to complete national broadband coverage using emerging 
alternative technologies. Accordingly, it is still unclear that incorporating a broadband requirement as part 
of the USO will have a net benefit. At this stage, the benefits of providing subsidies seem uncertain and 
certainly difficult to estimate. And this suggests that it would be difficult to make a persuasive case based 
on a thorough cost-benefit analysis. 
Social inclusion 
Broadband penetration rates in OECD countries are at present well under the penetration level where 
a households inability to access broadband services at a reasonable rate could be considered a form of 
social exclusion. In addition, it is doubtful if there are currently services available over broadband 
networks that are essential for a household to function in society. However, the situation may well change 
in an NGN world, especially if governments use broadband to deliver certain education, health and other 
public services. These might become as essential for households as the emergency services, now 
contactable by telephone, are today.  
There should therefore be regular monitoring for evidence of significant unevenness in the availability 
and take up of telecommunications, including broadband Internet access, among different regions and 
social groups. An exacerbation of such unevenness could heighten concerns regarding social exclusion. In 
addition, information about why households may not have Internet or broadband access could provide 
useful insights for public policy makers.50 
Discouragement of competitive entry 
Subsidisation programmes can have the effect of limiting and distorting competition because potential 
market entrants could be discouraged if they have to compete against a subsidised broadband provider 
offering high capability services at prices significantly below costs. For instance, incorporating a minimum 
data requirement into the USO can impact adversely on the development of competition in the industry, 
both through an imposition of higher USO levies on an incumbents competitors, and by further 
entrenching subsidisation of the incumbents services in USO net cost areas. This development may well 
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have the effect of dissuading innovative alternative providers from entering a market. Thus subsidisation 
programmes may turn out to have only short run advantages if they result in adverse long-run outcomes, 
including distortions to the nature, extent, and speed of technological innovation and investment.  
A requirement to provide national coverage of broadband in the context of a universal service 
framework could result in strengthening the incumbents position, since, at present, it may only be the 
incumbent that would have the ability to provide broadband on a national basis. For instance, the 
Australian Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) Review of the 
Operation of the Universal Service Obligation and Customer Service Guarantee in Australia (2004) 
arrived at conclusions confirming these concerns:   
• Finding 8.1 To some extent the current [USO] funding arrangements reduce the incentives for 
market entry, market growth or maintenance of market share by non-Telstra service providers, 
and this is a factor reinforcing Telstras dominance in the residential access market. 
• Finding 8.2 The current [USO] funding arrangements potentially inhibit the development of 
advanced services in regional, rural and remote areas, and raise efficiency concerns in the design 
and implementation of non-USO programmes and initiatives. (p. xv) 
The DCITA review was not required to consider whether the scope of the USO should be expanded to 
include services other than fixed telephone services and payphones. This is because the Australian 
Regional Telecommunications Inquiry (2002) concluded that the USO: is not an effective mechanism to 
provide broad consumer access to an increased range of services into the future and the Australian 
Government evidently accepted this conclusion. 
Ofcoms conclusion regarding the justification for extending USOs to include broadband 
Ofcom undertook a preliminary review of the case for extending USOs to include broadband 
(applying some of the criteria outlined earlier) and concluded that: as yet, the efficiency case for a 
broadband USO is not compelling due to the still limited take-up, the dangers of distorting the market 
(through non-technology neutral intervention at an early stage of market development), the lack of 
convincing efficiency or social policy arguments for universal broadband access and the number of 
existing private and public broadband initiatives.51 (Ofcom 2005) 
The Broadband Stakeholders Group concluded similarly: 
Heavy-handed intervention, either through the imposition of a universal service obligation or 
through large-scale subsidies would be inappropriate at this stage.52 
A USO approach to providing access to NGN assumes a common set of needs and would overlook the 
ability and incentives of a competitive market to tailor the price and capability of service to specific user 
needs and socio-economic constraints. For instance, broadband technologies can be made available to end 
consumers by means of various technologies with each technology more appropriate to specific customer 
groups and applications. Thus it is doubtful that the USO would be an efficient or effective policy 
mechanism for promoting supply to uneconomic areas that are heterogeneous in terms of either their:  
• Supply-side characteristics (for example, PSTN features, broadband services and mobile 
applications); or 
• Demand-side profiles (recognising that communications requirements differ markedly across age, 
income and educational groupings). 
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Thus a standardised blanket one size fits all mechanism such as the USO seems unsuitable to assist 
access in an NGN environment that is expected to spawn a huge range of services. Mere provision of a 
service to all areas/customers could be ineffective, indeed wasteful, if the intended beneficiary does not use 
it for lack of either need or skill.  
This suggests that there may be scope for a shift from a focus on uniform provision through a USOs 
approach to more customised solutions to support availability, including more targeted programmes to 
support affordability and accessibility (that, in turn, can support availability). 
5.5  How can affordability and accessibility be supported in an NGN environment?  
In considering this question, the essential strands of thought in this paper may be worth drawing 
together. With the technological change on the horizon (such as broadband wireless local loop), there is 
significant potential for availability of telecommunications services in rural and remote areas to be 
largely achieved over the next 5-10 years as we proceed towards NGN. Whether this potential materialises 
will depend importantly on the removal of disincentives to invest and barriers to entry. This includes 
removing price controls on monthly subscriber rentals and local call charges, and subsidies that favour the 
USO provider (thereby discouraging competitive entry). The problems of affordability and accessibility 
could remain but these can be addressed by specifically targeted subsidies that allow consumers in a multi-
platform NGN environment to themselves choose the service provider and technology most suitable to 
their needs.   
It seems appropriate that, as in other sectors of the economy, the cost of pursuing such social 
objectives be met by government general revenue since funding from this source would accord best with 
efficiency and equity.  
Assisting affordability and accessibility through targeted programmes 
In fact, targeted programmes are already being used on a small scale, such as Lifeline and Link-up in 
the United States, and so-called low user schemes in the United Kingdom. Some schemes offer a 
concession on certain charges to eligible old age, disadvantaged, disabled or low-income consumers for 
basic telecommunications services. Discounts are offered in respect to connection charges, monthly access 
charges and usage charges so that the rate of growth of a lower quartile bill is constrained. In the United 
Kingdom, the universal service provider is required to offer special services to customers with disabilities 
including text relay (that translates voice into text) for people who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, special 
format telephone bills for people who are blind or partially sighted, and a priority fault repair service. 
In Australia, for example, the incumbent carrier, Telstra, is obliged under its Carrier Licence 
Conditions, to offer a package of products and services to address the needs of low-income customers. 
Telstras Access for Everyone scheme contains programmes that target low-income Australians within 
the following seven segments: age pensioners; people with a disability; transient and homeless people; job 
seekers; people from non-English speaking backgrounds; indigenous Australians; and low-income 
families. Similar schemes exist in a number of other countries such as the United States, United Kingdom 
and Ireland. Information on these schemes is presented in Box 6 to indicate the type of targeted schemes 
that might be used to support affordability and accessibility in an NGN environment. 
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Box 6. Subsidies to support affordability directed at low-income consumers 
Country Scheme details 
Ireland Vulnerable user scheme.1 Customer gets line rental and EUR 5 worth of calls for EUR 23.65 per month. 
Once the EUR 5 worth of calls is used up, the user pays double the usual rates for the next EUR 6 worth 
of calls. Caller will therefore not be more than EUR 1 a month worse off under the scheme.  
The aim of the scheme is to limit increases in the size of vulnerable users telephone bills where they 
have relatively low levels of usage. The median bill of those customers who use the scheme will not 
increase by more than CPI-0%, which is the cap on the current Lower Quartile bill. 
UK Light user scheme.2 Eligible consumers get a rebate on line rental as long as they spend less than 
GBP 15.07 a quarter on calls. The amount of the rebate increases as the call bill gets smaller. This 
scheme uses low usage as a proxy for low income. BT has proposed an alternative scheme targeted at 
households with annual household income below GBP 10 400 (about USD 19 110). 
US Lifeline.3 A federally funded scheme wherein carriers are reimbursed for providing discounts on monthly 
phone bills. The scheme allows low income consumers to save up to USD 10.00 a month off their 
monthly phone bills.  
Some US states (e.g. Nebraska4, New Jersey5, Tennessee6) provide additional support of an amount up 
to USD 3.50.  
People living in indigenous tribal lands can also receive up to an additional USD 25 per month in 
support.   
The scheme is open to low-income consumers based on their participation in other low-income 
assistance programmes such as food stamps or energy assistance programmes. 
US Linkup.7 Provides savings of up to 50% of the installation fees of a new line, up to USD 30. People living 
in indigenous tribal lands can also receive additional support of up to USD 70. 
Notes: 1 Details available at http://www.comreg.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0348.pdf 
2 Details available at http://www.bt.com/Pricing/index.jsp and then clicking on Residential  Other Call Schemes  Light User Scheme 




7 Details available at http://www.lifelinesupport.org/li/components/linkup.asp. 
 
The phoneless 
In many countries there remains a percentage of the population without access to a telephone service 
sometimes because they are disconnected. This is true even in countries like the United States and Canada 
where telephone penetration exceeds 90% of the population. Studies in a number of countries, including 
the United States53 and Canada,54 indicate that phonelessness is usually associated with multiple 
contributing factors, such as poverty and unemployment. Many of the problems of the phoneless go 
beyond the scope of programmes to support affordability of telecommunications service and might be 
overcome only through appropriately designed social, employment and incomes policies. Nevertheless, 
there is scope for well-targeted assistance provided as part of a universal service programme to alleviate 
some of the barriers to telephony. And this also applies to well-targeted assistance for access to NGN. 
Some options that have been used to assist the needy to access telephony that could also be considered 
to assist access to NGN include:  
• Reviewing disconnection procedures to help customers unable to pay to stay connected to some 
more essential/emergency services. 
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• Improving provision of and ability to use pre-paid services (used by Telmex in Mexico);  such a 
service is along the lines of mobile pre-paid services but now also the increasingly common use 
of pre-paid cards to make low-cost international calls. 
• Providing low cost or free blocking services for expensive information-related services. 
• Requiring telephone operators to offer the option of an instalment payment plan or a bad debt 
repayment plan to customers, thus allowing customers to maintain service while making 
repayments. 
• Providing more substantial discounts off monthly access fees for those meeting eligibility 
requirements. 
• Ensuring greater awareness of assistance programmes through public announcements and 
targeted advertising.  
More attention is needed as to how a combination of subsidies can best help ensure support: to firms 
serving the highest-cost areas (to improve availability); direct (means-tested) subsidies to the most needy 
consumers, including through vouchers that they can spend on an operator of their choice (to assist 
affordability); and special schemes to assist the disabled (to assist accessibility). In addition, some shift in 
focus may be needed away from who pays for what, to a more people-centred approach, such as what do 
people need by way of access to affordable communications.55 
Competition in the delivery of service to support affordability and accessibility 
In the United Kingdom, the incumbent universal service provider, BT, has suggested that a regulator 
introduce competition in the delivery of support for affordability by inviting operators to propose bids for 
funding to introduce and operate these schemes. A number of schemes, each from a different operator, 
could be selected, the adjudication based on overall value-for-money, including a consideration of the 
amount of funding sought and the number of customers in the target group(s) predicted to use the schemes.  
This suggestion is worth further consideration since there could be distinct advantages in having 
competing schemes provided by different operators in the market. It would give choice of supplier to all 
consumers, not only those able to afford standard tariffs, and would enable the efficiency of each service to 
be compared. The requirement to bid for funds could also provide empirical evidence on the benefits of 
delivering the USOs.  
Box 7 summarises some key aspects of the foregoing discussion. 
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Box 7. Maintaining USOs: How provided and funded? 
USO service to be 
maintained 
How provided? How funded? 
Specified basic voice service 
(without specifying 
means/technology) 
Fixed, wireless, fixed-wireless, including 
Broadband wireless local loop, Powerline, satellite, 
etc operators. Allow/encourage entry of alternative 
technology providers in rural and remote areas. If 
necessary, subsidise provider selected by 
competitive tender.  
By Universal Service Fund? 
Public payphones (in reduced 
numbers, in selected 
locations) 
In longer-term as part of 
telecentres? 
Operator selected on basis of competitive tender. By government, including local 
government. 
Quality of service Service provider. By service provider. 
Access to emergency contact 
service 
Service provider. By service provider. 
Directory and directory 
assistance 
Commercially provided.   No funding required. 
Itemised billing Commercially provided. No funding required. 
Affordability: voice will be 
cheap, but functional 
Internet access could be a 
problem 
Commercially provided. Affordability supported by 
specifically targeted vouchers provided to needy 
consumers allowed to choose the service 
provider/technology/capacity to suit their 
requirements. For high-cost areas, operator 
providing functional Internet access could be 
selected on the basis of competitive tender. 
By government since this is 
primarily a social welfare 
objective.  
Accessibility: Services to the 
hearing, sight etc., impaired 
e.g. relay service that 
translates voice into text for 
hearing impaired 
Service provider to the extent required by general 
legislation concerning provision of service to 
disabled. Requirements over and above these to 
be provided on the basis of competitive tender.  
By government since 
assistance to disabled beyond 
general requirements (that 
apply to all sectors) is a social 
welfare objective (appropriately 
funded by government).  
Functional Internet Access.  
Although Broadband is 
required to enable functional 
access to NGN services, it is 
not part of USO at least not 
yet (see discussion 
elsewhere in this paper )  
 
Commercially provided. Affordability supported by 
specifically targeted vouchers provided to needy 
consumers allowed to choose the service 
provider/technology/capacity to suit their 
requirements. For high-cost areas, operator 
providing functional Internet access could be 
selected on the basis of competitive tender. 
A policy decision that 
broadband not be part of 
universal service does not 
undermine case for government 
policies to encourage 
competitive provision of 
broadband coupled with 
broadband diffusion policies 
aimed at addressing the digital 
divide. 
 
5.6  How should USOs be funded?  
As noted earlier, the speed and inevitability of widespread adoption of IP and wireless services are 
raising questions about the future funding of universal service.56 
One way of addressing the prospect of declining contribution from operators to the universal service 
fund is to curtail the scope of the USO programme. If curtailment is not politically feasible, an option is to 
expand the revenue base by applying a charge to all telecommunications services, including local and long-
distance calls and Internet access. This approach could allow a reduction in the percentage surcharge and 
would make the USF tax less distorting. Financing by operators could arguably constrain universal service 
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programmes to relatively efficient levels since it would probably encourage operators to sustain pressure 
on regulators/policy makers to justify the costs of universal service obligations they are forced to bear 
against evidence of the benefits generated.  But the task of calculating an equitable scheme for sharing 
USO costs has become challenging. Extending the range of companies that need to contribute to universal 
service is one option, as was done recently by France where all suppliers of electronic communication 
services contribute to universal service (where retail sales exceed a given threshold). Indeed, the Australian 
Government has moved to a more administrative determination of the level of subsidy paid to the USO 
provider in preference to costing the USO based on economic modelling. The Australian difficulties in 
calculating the cost of the USO were highlighted in the DCITA Review of the Operation of the Universal 
Service Obligation and Customer Service Guarantee (2004).57  
A tax on each telephone number 
An alternative is to charge a fixed fee for each telephone number assigned in the country whether 
fixed line or wireless.58 It would be relatively easy to administer, readily understood by consumers, 
promote telephone number conservation and has the ability to raise predictable amounts of revenue 
through relatively small imposts on each number. For instance, in the United States there are 
approximately 500 million such numbers. As an example, a USD 1 per month charge (far less than the 
current subscriber line charge for fixed line phones of USD 5.96) would generate USD 6 billion in revenue 
per year. (One estimate is that the initial amount of the numbers tax that would be needed would range 
from between USD 0.59 and USD 0.77 per month.59) Such a fixed fee would make the funds supporting 
universal service competitively and technology neutral since all providers using numbers from a national 
numbering plan can be included (including wireless, cable and VoIP providers).  
Hazlett, et al.,60 argue that this approach minimises the distorting effect of the universal service fund 
on prices and utilisation of services and also makes the tax more transparent. A broad-based numbers tax is 
a tax on access rather than usage. Since the demand for access generally is considered to be less price 
sensitive than the demand for usage, the distortions to economic behaviour are likely to be less. Moreover, 
a small, broad-based tax is unlikely to distort economic decisions significantly. The tax may create 
incentives to adopt technologies that bypass the tax, but such incentives are likely to be small since the tax 
is a small one.61 Such a tax would, however, serve as an incentive to large businesses which have direct 
numbers for each employee to reduce their use of numbers by reconfiguring their PBXs.  In addition, 
funding universal service should be based on the cost of providing universal service, costs which should 
decline over time based on experiences in many countries.  If funded through a tax there could be little 
incentive for authorities to reduce this tax over time. A concern about a flat fee on each number is that it is 
a regressive tax since low users and the poor would pay as much as high users and the rich. But this 
concern might be addressed e.g. by exempting the poor, including lifeline users etc., from paying the 
numbers tax. 
There are other concerns such as the potential for bypass. A telephone number is not essential for 
voice communications as Skype and some other VoIP operators are demonstrating. Such bypass could 
become a significant problem if there is increased use of this system. Also, there are questions about the 
extent to which a numbers-based system that does not cover IP/ENUM addressing would encourage and 
speed adaptation of telephone numbering to the Internets domain name system.  Distortions in the market 
could also result because what the revenue operators earn from each number is quite variable, there would 
be an incentive to use foreign numbers or addresses and other attempts to bypass a tax.   
A connections-based system 
Another option is a connections-based system through which any connection to a network, whether 
it is a data or telephone network, is taxed with revenue channelled towards universal service programmes. 
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While a connections/line approach is similar to a numbers-based system in that contributions to universal 
service would be based on the number of connections, it raises a number of questions regarding the 
definition of a connection, including simple residential telephone lines and high-capacity business lines 
with dozens/hundreds of voice-grade equivalents.    
Another option is some sort of hybrid approach that seeks to combine a number of schemes e.g. a 
combination of a levy on each number and usage charge. A numbers-based plan could miss the revenue 
from high-capacity data pipes without some sort of connections allowance.  
Alternatively, funds could be raised through a supplementary levy on consumers (residential and 
business) bills. This is done in other sectors such as the airline industry where air passenger duty (United 
Kingdom) or airport taxes (Australia) are levied on each ticket with funds raised used to support the airline 
sector. Making the contribution to the USO fund transparent in this way makes it easier for the public to 
assess the costs of universal service.  
Financing through general taxation revenue 
In considering this option, it is important to bear in mind that many governments pay for, or subsidise, 
the purchase of food, shelter, clothing, and education for specific socio-economic groups out of general 
taxation revenue without imposing the cost on the suppliers or retailers of those products. Funding based 
on taxation revenue would help ensure that the burden is shared in the most equitable manner. Are the 
reasons why arrangements should be different in communications compelling enough? With 
telecommunications operators increasingly operating in intensively competitive markets and circumstances 
similar to those in other industries, they should be increasingly treated in a similar way with similar 
obligations and rights. As the telecommunications industry converges with the broadcasting and 
information technology industries, this need for symmetric treatment becomes even more important. 
In this context, governments should ensure that telecommunications consumers and companies are not 
subject to a range of taxes over and above the normal taxes that companies pay. In the United States, for 
example, the communications excise tax (FET) is imposed on communications services (defined to include 
local as well as long distance telephone service) at a rate of 3%, with revenue flowing into general revenue. 
(It is interesting to note that the FET was first introduced as a temporary luxury tax way back in 1898 to 
fund the Spanish American War.) 
An FET increases the cost of communications services for all consumers and seems contrary to the 
goal of having an advanced, efficient, low cost communications network that achieves universal service. 
Placing an extra cost on communications services use discourages not only the expansion and 
improvement of the communications infrastructure but also the technologies that build upon the 
infrastructure.   
It is estimated that telecommunications is one of the most heavily excise-taxed local services in the 
United States, yielding about USD 22 billion annually. Depending on where the consumer lives, taxes can 
account for roughly 2% to 21% of a monthly phone bill.62  
Moreover, the FET is arguably a regressive, inequitable, inefficient and difficult to administer tax.63 
With the wide array of communications technologies and service options available to consumers, leaving 
the current tax in place results in some consumers paying the tax while other consumers purchasing 
comparable communications services do not.  
Requiring telecommunications operators to bear the cost of providing support for advanced services to 
schools and libraries (as in the United States) was a significant change in USO principles and practice. 
Even where the reasoning in favour of special support for these institutions is accepted, the requirement 
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that telecommunications operators or consumers bear the cost of subsidised provision is open to challenge. 
As noted earlier, in the European Union the guidelines in the Universal Service Directive prohibit funding 
of schemes outside the scope of the formal USO definition from a Universal Service Fund. This does not 
prohibit national governments from designing assistance schemes for access to Information Society 
programmes, including broadband, so long as they are funded separately (e.g. from general revenue). 
While acknowledging the arguments of some economic analysts that direct government taxation is 
likely to be a cost-effective means (US Congress Budget Office report, 2005), indeed, perhaps the most 
cost-effective means, regulators sometimes pre-empt discussion of direct government funding from 
taxation revenue on the grounds that it is too hard. For instance, Ofcom states that: while direct 
government taxation is likely to be the most effective means, it is probably one of the most difficult to 
implement64 and then proceeds to discuss other sources of funding. Regulators may need to be more 
aggressive in pushing for the direct support of universal service through government funding (at least in 
part). 
Economic analysis provides support for financing USO through general taxation revenue on the basis 
that it is likely to be less distortive. The economic (excess burden) cost of raising a dollar in general 
revenues (in terms of distortions to the supply and use of factors of production) is generally less than the 
economic cost of raising a dollar from sector-specific taxes, which tend to distort consumer choice by 
affecting the price of goods and services.65  Indeed, a number of economic analysts have recommended that 
future universal service support should come from general tax revenues.66 
In Australia, the government-appointed Independent Regional Telecommunications Inquiry 
recommended (Rec 9.5) that the government should provide funding for future service improvements in 
regional, rural and remote Australia, rather than imposing financial obligations on the telecommunications 
industry:  
The Inquiry does not consider industry subsidisation of future sharing arrangements is 
appropriate. It considers industry funding to meet the costs of non-commercial 
telecommunications needs would impose a significant financial burden on the industry, and 
would negatively affect investment incentives, not just in regional Australia but nationally. 
Ultimately, it would also impact negatively on prices paid by consumers for telecommunications 
services. Government funding is preferred by the Inquiry.67 (p. 249).  
And a little later the report states: 
It is appropriate for Government to directly fund its social and economic telecommunications 
policy objectives, as it does other policy priorities.68 (p. 250) 
The Australian Governments response was to accept the principle that support for non-commercial 
service improvements in regional Australia should be provided transparently by government, and should 
aim to promote competition and minimise market distortions.69 
There is also political support for this position in other OECD countries. For instance, the Chairman 
of the US House Energy and Commerce Committee said the E-rate program in the US should be funded 
out of general revenue through the general appropriations process, not through a specific contributions 
process.70  
A major concern regarding government funding is that the predictability of subsidy amounts is an 
important characteristic of a subsidy and funding scheme and that the competing demands for government 
funding could make such funding more uncertain in the longer term and susceptible to change. But there is 
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a strong argument that this is as it should be. That is, that continued support for telecommunications 
subsidies should be regularly justified against such competing demands.  
Contribution from local government and other government departments. Support for 
telecommunications is widely rationalised on the grounds that it can help deliver improved service to 
education, health, agriculture, e-government and telecentres in rural and remote regions. This suggests that 
a number of government agencies might contribute to a Universal Service Fund to support 
telecommunications access. Allocating responsibility for delivering programme outcomes to key spending 
ministries can have other benefits such as a shared sense of ownership across all participating ministries 
and local government. In addition, telecommunications operators can form partnerships with local 
government agencies to help ensure the initiative contributes to local economic development. Small 
business support could also be enlisted. For instance, any telecentres established are likely to be in a central 
location probably suitable for business activities. During the day a telecentre could be used for training for 
Internet use, etc, while at night it could be used for business activities. For example, it could be a suitable 
location for telecommunications operators to market their products, sell their pre-paid cards, etc., along the 
lines of one-stop shopping.  
Contribution from spectrum auctions (3G), spectrum pricing and privatisation.  Some of the proceeds 
from telecommunications licence fees, including spectrum pricing fees, could be contributed to a USF. 
Also, part of the proceeds of spectrum auctions might be allocated to USO purposes. In addition, a 
proportion of the proceeds of privatization of telecommunications operators could be allocated to support 
universal access and universal service programmes. For instance, in Australia, 5% of the proceeds from 
privatising the second tranche of Telstra's shares were allocated to improving conditions in rural areas 
based on the rationale that this constitutes an equitable sharing.  
There may be concerns about using a once-only contribution from privatisation receipts to fund 
recurring expenditure on universal service. However, this concern might be addressed by using the 
contribution to generate a time stream of revenue. For instance, in a submission to the DCITAs review of 
universal service,71 the Australian Telecommunications Users Group (ATUG) proposed that part of the 
proceeds of a further sale of Telstra be put into a Trust Fund the earnings from which could be used to pay 
subsidies for telecommunications. (Where a country has already fully privatised its telecommunications 
operators, or where this is not a feasible option, the government could, alternatively, contribute an amount 
out of general revenue to establish such a Trust Fund.)  
Whatever the funding mechanism chosen, it is important to ensure that it is carefully structured and 
targeted so as to minimise market distortions. Moreover, it should score relatively well (compared with 
alternatives) on the basis of the criteria listed in Box 8.  
Box 8. Criteria for assessing a funding mechanism 
Broadly, the merits of a funding arrangement can be judged according to its implications for: 
• Economic efficiency  the financing of universal service should distort economic behaviour as little as possible. 
• Equity  equity is a contentious normative criterion that may be variously defined/assessed e.g. whether there are 
similar costs for people with similar abilities to pay, and whether contributions are fair and reasonable. 
• Competitive neutrality  does not discriminate in favour of any company. 
• Technology neutrality  does not discriminate in favour of any technology. 
• Certainty  specific, predictable and sustainable arrangements. 
• Transparency  the opportunity for public scrutiny of information, to the maximum extent possible. 




• Avoidance  scope for avoidance minimised. 
A preliminary consideration of funding options summarised in Box 9 suggests that several funding 
sources appear to score well against these criteria. For instance, using part of the proceeds of privatisation 
or of spectrum auctions or spectrum pricing scores highly. Funding from general revenue also scores well, 
except perhaps on the basis of certainty (at least in the longer term) and, some assert, political feasibility 
(at least in the short term?). By contrast with such assertions, many of the submissions in response to the 
EUs consultation document on universal service favoured government funding.72 
A connections-based tax scores well too. And a tax on telephone numbers also appears to score 
relatively well. As mentioned earlier, the primary concern here seems to be the perceived inequity of this 
financing approach. There might also be concerns that it does not contain adequate safeguards to constrain 
governments from increasing the levy per telephone number in order to enable (politically popular) 
expansion of the scope of universal service. While political gains flowing from universal service 
programmes can be preserved/gained at the expense of operators and/or consumers, restraint over universal 
service (needed to stimulate innovation and cost-effective USO programmes) is less likely. Government 
funding would link decisions concerning the nature and scope of universal service more closely with 
financial responsibility for such decisions. This would help prevail against excessive growth by installing 
in-built incentives to cap (or at least to restrain) political disposition for universal service expenditure. 
Nonetheless, for pragmatic reasons, including political realities, it might be sensible to draw on a 
combination of funding sources, especially in the short-term. However, in the longer-term, the option of 
funding universal service from general taxation revenue needs careful consideration. Since it is the political 
process that will decide on what the warranted level of universal service will be, it may seem appropriate 
that the case for continued funding of universal service programmes be assessed against arguments in 
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The distribution of USO funds 
This topic is not a primary focus of this paper.73 Nonetheless, a number of points in regard to the 
distribution of funds has been made. A few are worth reiteration. The first point is that there is need to 
strive for cost-effectiveness in the distribution of USO funds as in other aspects of USO programmes. 
Accordingly, various means of improving the cost-effective distribution of funds should be explored, such 
as competitive tendering. Because of information asymmetry in regard to the costs of providing universal 
service, the use of competitive tendering can have advantages and should be considered. Also, 
i) incumbents can no longer be viewed as being the sole providers responsible for USOs; and ii) that USOs 
should be narrowly defined such that if there are other areas that governments want to support (e.g. access 
to high-speed networks by schools, libraries, hospitals, etc. they should be funded outside of the scope of 
USO policies and preferably through direct funding). Moreover, that there is need for systematic 
monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the distribution of funds (and other aspects of universal 
service). 
5.7  The need for systematic monitoring and evaluation 
Any redefinition of the scope, delivery and funding of universal service should be conducted on the 
basis of a transparent systematic review to clarify objectives and targets pertinent to that country. In some 
countries, e.g. Australia, Hungary, the United Kingdom and India, the USOs strategy development 
procedure commenced with a public consultation that sought the views of various stakeholders. This 
approach to defining universal service would be consistent with the transparency required by the WTO 
Reference Paper provision relating to universal service.  
Systematic monitoring and evaluation based on good up-to-date data is also critically important to 
ensure that targets are being achieved cost-effectively according to schedule. Also important are regular 
audits of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the administration of a programme to distribute 
USO funds in order to guard against inefficiency and fraud. These should include audits of the recipients of 
universal service subsidies to assess the extent to which USO programmes are achieving intended 
outcomes. Reports of such assessments could be tabled in Parliament at regular intervals (e.g. once every 
three(?) years).  As part of this periodic review process, the regulator would be required inter alia, to assess 
the impact of universal service support on availability, affordability and accessibility, as well as the 
continuing need for universal service support in view of developments in competition and technology, 
especially if the promise of new technologies such as broadband wireless local loop, Powerline, etc., 
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